

THE Nation

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NUMBER 1

The Shape of Things

FINLAND'S SUCCESS IN WITHSTANDING THE onslaughts of the Red Army has its most eloquent testimony in the reticence of recent official Soviet communiqués. For over a week Moscow's daily statements have declared "nothing important" to be happening on the fighting fronts, although successes have been claimed for Russian bombers. Had there been victories to record, they would certainly have been hailed with gusto. Hence the negative nature of Moscow's news tends to confirm the main tenor of Finnish reports, if not their details. It remains to be seen whether the fresh troops which the Soviet command is said to be sending into action and the appointment of General Gregory Stern, hero of the Manchurian campaigns, will bring about any dramatic change of fortune. Aerial bombardments, while they may cause death and destruction, are not by themselves likely to prove decisive and are hardly calculated to increase the enthusiasm of the Finnish workers for their "liberators." Meanwhile the damaged prestige of the Red Army is having repercussions elsewhere. In a defiant speech King Carol asserted that both Bessarabia and Bukovina would be defended to the last man. Persistent reports of Soviet activity in the direction of India deserve to be treated with extreme skepticism. Invasion of India would necessitate a campaign through some of the most difficult country in the world and prove a test of organization and transport even more severe than that provided by the Finnish war. The origin of most of these reports is Rome, and they may be regarded as Italian propaganda for an anti-Bolshevik peace between Germany and the Allies.

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MANY PEOPLE ATTRIBUTE THE PRESIDENT'S latest peace move to considerations of internal politics and in particular to a desire to catch the Catholic vote. We are loath to accept this interpretation, which by implication would convict him of levity. It is not the view taken in London and Paris, where the President's action has had an unfavorable reception. A few days ago somebody asked the President the pertinent question whether the Pope had been approached in his religious or political capacity. It is really impossible to distinguish

between the two. At the time of the Concordat between the Papacy and the Italian government that acute French Catholic, Maurice Pernot, said in the *Journal des Débats*, of which he was for many years the Rome correspondent, that the Papacy had sacrificed the international interests of the church to its national interests. Events have justified him. The policy of the Vatican is now an Italian nationalist and Fascist policy. The Pope blessed and encouraged the Italian aggressions against Abyssinia and Republican Spain and deserted the Basque Catholics. Since Mr. Roosevelt's initiative we have had the semi-official declaration that the Pope and Mussolini have agreed to work for peace and combat communism. It was followed by the Pope's visit to the King of Italy, in the course of which His Holiness prayed for divine protection for "the illustrious chief of the Italian government" and declared that the wisdom of its rulers was making Italy great, strong, and respected before the world. Mr. Roosevelt's initiative seems likely to bolster Mussolini's waning prestige in Italy and to encourage the small minorities in England and France who are demanding peace with Germany in order to attack Russia. Is this what Mr. Roosevelt desired?

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IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY'S neutral neighbors for war-time trade agreements, Britain's main objective is to prevent their acting as entrepôts through which the Reich could obtain imports from overseas. The blockade provides it with a powerful argument, for unless the country concerned agrees not to pass on supplies to Germany it is likely to find shipments for its own needs held up indefinitely. The war-time trade treaty just signed by Britain and Sweden is understood to contain a pledge by the latter to use imported goods only for domestic consumption, and in the case of certain strategic raw materials to limit its purchases to amounts imported over a fixed pre-war period. We have also ground for believing that Sweden has undertaken not to expand shipments of its own iron ore to Germany. The negotiations were probably speeded up by Russia's attack on Finland. Sweden, although nominally neutral, is rendering much unofficial aid to the Finns, and its own position as next in line must make it look for outside support. Its difficulty is how to cooperate with the Allies in backing the Finns without giving Germany an excuse to attack it.

FURTHER INDICATION OF JAPAN'S GROWING difficulties was provided last week by the petition presented by a majority of the members of the Diet calling for the Cabinet's resignation. The fact that the action was spontaneous and unofficial, and therefore not binding on the Cabinet, does not in any sense detract from its importance as a sign of deep-seated discontent with the results of the China war. While this discontent has been nourished chiefly by heavy war losses, high prices, and steadily falling living standards, it has undoubtedly been intensified by the frustration of Japanese foreign policy. As January 26 approaches, it becomes clear that there will be no new Japanese-American trade treaty to replace the old one on the date of expiration. This gives the United States veto power over Japan's imperialistic ambitions on the Asiatic mainland. A hint that Japan recognizes the impossibility of pushing its campaign to a successful conclusion appeared last week in press comments on the outlook for the trade treaty. The popular newspaper *Yomiuri* predicted that as a result of American pressure the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei might never materialize. If this is true, it represents a major setback for Japan. For unless Japan can establish a centralized regime with semi-responsible Chinese leadership, it must depend solely on force of arms to hold the occupied territories.



ELECTION-YEAR SESSIONS OF CONGRESS DO not as a rule make history. Too much controversy is bad: it puts Congressmen on the spot, takes their minds off the necessary fence-mending at home, makes for party disunity when the lines should be drawn against the common enemy, and presents the legislators with a log jam of debatable bills at a time when they want to push off to the conventions. Matters are even more delicate when, as in the present instance, Congress is packed with Men Who Would Be President. Nevertheless, there are some questions that can't be evaded. By the time this issue of *The Nation* reaches the newsstands, the President will have delivered his budget message, and if present indications are reliable he will have put the economy bloc in something of a hole. Its members face several unpleasant alternatives. They can slash appropriations, including those for farm aid and work relief, but no Congressman likes to deprive his constituency of federal hand-outs in an election year. They can vote for increased taxes, but that would make them even less popular. Or they can sanction more government borrowing, perhaps even voting to raise the legal \$45,000,000,000 limitation on the government debt, which now stands at some \$41,000,000,000. But in that case what becomes of their crusade for a balanced budget? The second course would normally be the soundest, but, given the temper of the Seventy-sixth Congress, it is socially the most dangerous, since thoughts on increased revenues have been running toward some form of real or disguised federal sales tax.

ASIDE FROM BUDGETARY MATTERS THERE are few issues likely to be pushed to a showdown. The reciprocal-trade system will have to fight for its life against a Democratic-Republican coalition of protective-tariff champions, and linked with its fate are the Presidential aspirations of Cordell Hull. A spate of resolutions for breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union are in the offing, and an equal number for stopping raw-material shipments to Japan. Serious pressure is expected for more drastic "alien-and-sedition" legislation; the Dies committee will make an all too hopeful fight for a renewal of its franchise, although its own division of opinion should help to discredit it; and the Smith committee will attempt to make out a case for its pitiful "exposure" of the National Labor Relations Board. All manner of proposals to discourage this country's entry into the war may be expected, and perhaps further attempts to restrict the President's discretionary powers in carrying out the provisions of the new neutrality law; most of these will be offered with an eye on the coming election campaign and will hardly blow the lid off the Capitol.



THE QUESTION OF THE CONCENTRATION OF financial control of industry is once again to the fore both in Washington and Wall Street. Evidence presented before the TNEC suggests that, however effective the Banking Act of 1933 may have been in the protection of depositors, the time-honored system of "tied-house" security financing has been scarcely touched. In the financial district acute controversy has been raised by Halsey, Stuart's demand that capital issues for publicly regulated corporations be made with competitive bidding. In the case of the Consumers' Power issue, to be made by a syndicate headed by Morgan, Stanley and Company and Bonbright and Company, the SEC after prolonged deliberations has decided it may go forward in part. The commission has still to determine, however, whether the relationship between the bankers and the power corporation, a subsidiary of Commonwealth and Southern, was such as to permit "arm's-length bargaining." Its present ruling affects a different principle, that of capital structure, and on this point its decision was to allow the bond issue to the amount needed for refunding but to forbid the raising of new money in this form on the ground that the corporation's debt already represented too large a proportion of its total capital. Meanwhile, the argument over "arm's-length bargaining" versus "cheek-to-cheek negotiations" has erupted into the railroad field as a result of Halsey, Stuart's protest against the allotment of a Louisville and Nashville \$60,000,000 refunding issue to Morgan, Stanley and Company. This step has not halted the offering, but it brings before the ICC the whole question of open competition for issues of railroad securities.

JANUARY 26, 1938

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FRANK MURPHY'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT the Department of Justice is planning to investigate the promoters of anti-Semitism reads like welcome, if belated, news. But the announcement seems to contain one serious "escape clause." According to press accounts Mr. Murphy, when asked whether the probe would turn its spotlight on Father Coughlin, disclaimed knowledge of any evidence that the unholy father was anti-Semitic, and pointed out further that his inquiry was directed at "organizations." We hope that this is not a complete summary of Mr. Murphy's views. An investigation which failed to touch Father Coughlin's network would be as meaningless as a probe of anti-Catholicism which overlooked the Ku Klux Klan. No doubt it will be a good deal easier—and politically less precarious—to prosecute the Bundsmen and other plainly foreign agencies. But these groups are incomparably less influential than their native counterparts, of whom Father Coughlin is the spiritual father. Nowhere is anti-Semitism preached more flagrantly than in his Royal Oak pulpit and in the pages of *Social Justice*, and by no one is it practiced more savagely than by the Christian Front, the Social Justice clubs, and other Coughlin groups. While Coughlin has shrewdly denied any official link with these groups, its existence is made clear every week in *Social Justice*. If Mr. Murphy is planning a serious tour through the anti-Semitic hot spots, his first stop should be Royal Oak, Michigan.

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WE ARE SURE THAT WEST COAST SHIPPING interests share William Green's disappointment in the Landis decision on Bridges, but for the labor movement as a whole it represents a resounding victory. It is clear from the published summary of Dean Landis's conclusions that his stomach was turned by the plain and fancy lying which made up a large part of the testimony against Bridges, and by the revelation that an official of the United States Immigration Service dangled the possibility of a pardon before a prisoner if he would give evidence against Bridges. This official, Raphael P. Bonham, immigration inspector at Seattle, and others like him on the Coast ought to be given a departmental trial and, if found guilty of such conduct, dismissed from the service. We hope that Landis's finding that on the evidence Bridges is neither a Communist nor affiliated with the Communist Party will put a damper on the perennial campaign against the labor leader. Whether Bridges would be deportable if he were a Communist was left undecided. We should protest against his deportation in any case. The real objection to him is his militancy as a labor leader.

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WHEN THE AMERICAN STUDENT UNION'S annual convention last week rejected a resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Finland, it presented

a precious New Year's gift to Martin Dies. The resolution itself was moderate in tone and simultaneously warned against the dangers of an anti-Soviet crusade. The fact that it was so overwhelmingly defeated in even this form may appear to the *Daily Worker* as a sweeping vindication of Russian policy and something to write *Pravda* about, but the victory is bound to prove costly. Until this convention, membership in the Student Union was widely regarded as a valuable part of an undergraduate's education. We suspect that this view more accurately reflected the Union's real character than did its rejection of the resolution. But as James Wechsler pointed out in last week's *Nation*, the unique and unflagging energy of the Communists in rallying their followers to action is bound to give a distorted picture of their numerical strength. The defeat of a proposal for a membership referendum on the issue may indicate that they are aware of the discrepancy between their influence and their numbers.

Britain's War Economy

WETHER or not the war is finally decided on the economic front, economic weapons are at present playing a paramount role. The Allies' blockade appears increasingly effective and is now being reinforced by a series of agreements with neutrals which will gradually stop many leaks. At the same time the prospects of Russian economic aid to Germany, never rated very high by experts, have been further diminished by the unexpected drain on Soviet resources brought about by Finland's tough resistance.

But while the campaign against German trade offers cause for satisfaction, the Allies, and Britain in particular, have no reason for complacency about the organization of the home front. In four months of war Britain has proliferated controls, commissions, and committees to deal with every branch of commerce and industry; it has not succeeded in working out any kind of unified economic plan for the most efficient utilization of its immense resources. The British press is full of complaints of overlapping authorities, maldistribution of available raw materials, obstacles placed in the way of exports which are essential for the maintenance of foreign-exchange supplies, and so on. Grumbling, of course, plays an important part in the democratic process, and the amount now going on in Britain is, in a way, reassuring. Nevertheless, its volume and still more its quality suggest that greater drive and imagination are needed in high places and less trust in the spirit of "muddling through."

The most vital question, on which policy seems still in a state of flux, is that of financing the war. Early in October Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced his war budget and announced that the gov-

ernment intended to avoid inflation and pay the bill by means of taxation and loans representing real savings instead of created credit. At the same time both direct and indirect taxes were heavily increased. But expenditure is mounting still more rapidly. It is already at the annual rate of £2,400,000,000, or nearly half the pre-war national income, and has not yet reached a maximum. Meanwhile, despite efforts to control prices, the cost of living has been rising, and the *Economist* index of wholesale prices showed an increase of 23 per cent between the beginning of the war and November 28. As a result workers have been demanding higher wages, and the better-organized groups have obtained at least partial satisfaction. At the same time there is growing pressure on the government to increase payments to old-age pensioners, soldiers' dependents, and other recipients of public funds—the first victims of the high cost of living.

Such demands are fully justified, but an all-round increase in incomes occurring simultaneously with a diminished supply of consumers' goods means inflation. The problem which the British government must face sooner or later can best be expressed mathematically. Supposing maximum national production is x billion pounds and war requirements are y billion, then x minus y billion remains to be divided up among all receivers of incomes. It is axiomatic, or ought to be, that every family should receive at least enough for subsistence, but how is the balance, if any, to be split in accordance with that blessed principle—equality of sacrifice? Even if you take 90 per cent of an income of \$100,000—and Britain has not yet approached so drastic a level of taxation—the sacrifice involved is not the same as that presented by a 10 per cent deduction from the pay of a \$15-a-week wage-earner.

The fact remains, however, that it is improbable that sufficient reduction in current consumption can be obtained without encroaching on the standard of living of at least the better-paid workers—a step bound to raise political as well as economic difficulties. This is not to say that the workers would under all circumstances refuse to tighten their belts. But they are likely to insist that, before they are asked to do so, unused resources and labor should be productively employed, that all necessities should be rationed so as to allow for a fair distribution of available supplies, and that the purchasing power of the rich and the comfortable should be brought into closer relationship with working-class incomes by either further taxation or compulsory loans, or by both. But the British government could only take such steps as these if it were prepared to enforce far more basic alterations in the economic and class structure than it has hitherto been willing to attempt. Business, as much as possible, as usual, is still its motto.

J. M. Keynes has attempted to solve its dilemma for it by suggesting a scheme by which a graduated levy would be made on all incomes, above a low minimum,

deductible at the source. The amount paid by each "contributor" would be credited to his account in the government savings bank, after the deduction of direct taxes due, and would earn $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest. But the accounts would be frozen, except possibly in the event of unemployment or serious illness, until after the war, when, as Mr. Keynes points out, their release would be a useful offset to the probable post-war deflation. This plan would certainly prove fairer to the workers than either inflation or the kind of wage control long since adopted in Germany and now in France. But it has aroused great opposition in both labor and business circles. No alternative has yet been produced, however, and it is doubtful how much longer Britain can continue to drift on stormy seas with its financial machinery only partially functioning. Before long it must assuredly face the problem of making its turbines deliver their maximum power even if this involves revolutionary changes in their mechanism.

Happy New Year!

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

LISTENING to the radio this past week-end was a depressing introduction to the New Year. Almost every turn of the dial produced a note of cheer which rang false and induced melancholy in the hearer. Peace was detected over the horizon, but no speaker remarked that the horizon is an ever-receding and therefore non-existent boundary. Prosperity in our own country was hailed, though with some appropriate warnings of the later effects of even the most profitable war. And the blessings of liberty and democracy were added up to an astonishing total, without, I thought, any sufficient recognition that they face great hazards from within or that the war in Europe and Asia may create a world in which they will be a hopeless handicap.

Peace, if it came soon, would be a calamity, because a peace based on the status quo ante Munich would be no peace at all but only an armistice on the front to be used by Hitler for the consolidation of past conquests and preparation of others to come. When a man like John Haynes Holmes can say that "the close of this dreadful decade is glorified by cooperation between America and Rome to save mankind before it is too late," one fears that Ethiopia and the Spanish republic fell in vain. The President, in setting up a committee of religious leaders and sending a personal representative to the Vatican, may have intended only to encourage long-range thinking on peace while, incidentally, fostering political good feeling in anticipation of the coming campaign. But it is a dangerous maneuver just the same, and unforeseen ill-effects may spring from it. A decent settlement will come only after the downfall of Hitler and then only if men who understand the economic and political needs

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of Europe are in power in the leading countries. These ends cannot be furthered by hopeful New Year nonsense about an early peace.

Optimistic prophecies about the prospects of the home team seem equally questionable. Our liberties are going to be under fire from several directions. Only an understanding of the anatomy of fascism and a sharp sense of domestic realities can successfully counter the attempt of such allied groups as the Dies committee, Coughlin and his satellite hoodlums, and reactionary business interests to carry out a large-scale anti-radical, anti-alien program. Ordinary Americans, unaccustomed to the more concealed sorts of fascist propaganda, may swallow a dangerous dose of Diesism without knowing what's in it.

If the Dies committee is continued, it will have a serious effect on the coming campaign—if not on the future of civil rights in the United States. It will be used to blast the New Deal and the integrity of liberals in the government service, from the President down. In fact, in his coming report to Congress Mr. Dies is expected to wipe out all distinctions between "Communist" and "Liberal" and thus to brand the New Deal with a red label. The decision of Dean Landis in the Bridges case shows how difficult it is for a conscientious investigator to establish a man's political status. But Landis's scrupulous regard for evidence may, I fear, serve as a spur to repressive action rather than an example of juridical integrity. In any case, the Dies virus has spread. Liberals and radicals will have to fight boldly to preserve their rights to speak and act as they think. They should recognize the Dies committee for what it is—the Congressional arm of a country-wide reactionary drive—and not be taken in by irrelevant talk about ferreting out sedition. Mr. Dies isn't after sedition; he is after you and me and the President. If every *Nation* reader would tell his Congressman that he wants no more of Dies and his committee, it would add up to a formidable protest. But time is short.

Then the questions of unemployment and relief. These are too large to discuss in the limits of a page, but they must be reckoned into any New Year calculations of American prosperity. After almost eight years of New Deal effort and in spite of a considerable increase in business activity, unemployment still stands at almost 9,000,000. Measures adopted by the Administration have been useful, but they are not good enough. The prospect of a retreat from the New Deal under a Republican Administration is, humanly speaking, appalling. Meanwhile the coming election will probably serve to freeze relief during the balance of the year at the lowest possible level consistent with gathering in the vote, and to stop fundamental reforms altogether.

As for our current prosperity, whatever that means when millions of workers are hungry and idle, it was apparently born to die at an early age. Mr. Hutchison

analyzes its prospects on another page of this issue, and in their New Year's messages Messrs. Lewis and Green agreed at least in reminding the country that if measures of reform and relief are allowed to lapse during a wartime boom, monstrous suffering will certainly follow. But their warnings are likely to fall on deaf ears—the ears of politicians interested in no deluges scheduled after the fall of 1940.

If I seem to repudiate all proffered arguments of hope, it does not follow that I despair. On the contrary I see many good omens in the January sky. Only they happen to be different from those noted by the year-end radio orators. I see, for instance, definite signs that the Allies will refuse offers of new Munichs in 1940; that the American people will fight for their liberties if and when they realize that the Coughlins and Dieses are out to kill instead of defend them; that they are not yet politically ready to swing to reaction as an alternative to inadequate reform. These are modest reasons for hope, but they may be enough to prevent the New Year from sealing the triumph of reaction abroad and at home.

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The Nation's Honor Roll for 1939

FOR the twelfth successive year *The Nation* presents its list of individuals and organizations deserving honorable mention for their activities during the past twelve months.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, for refusing to be intimidated by the Dies committee and its champions, for her helpful interest in the problems of young men and women, and for her quiet, intelligent, and dogged defense of democratic principles throughout the year.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, for the part he has played since he became Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court in extending the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to freedom of expression, as exemplified in the Hague case and the handbill ordinance decisions.

THE FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, for its unostentatious, non-political, and enormously effective work of bringing physical relief to the innocent victims of war and aggression, especially in Spain and Poland; and the **FOSTER PARENTS' PLAN FOR WAR CHILDREN**, for its heroic work in providing refuges for the orphaned children of Loyalist Spain.

RAYMOND GRAM SWING and **ELMER DAVIS**, news commentators for the Mutual and Columbia broadcasting systems, respectively, for the most illuminating running analyses of Europe's tangled affairs.

MAURY MAVERICK, mayor of San Antonio, for making an important political comeback, for upholding civil rights, and for successfully withstanding an unscrupulous attempt to wreck his official career.

CLAUDE BOWERS, now ambassador to Chile, for the loyalty to democratic principles which characterized his career as ambassador to the Spanish Republic.

CULBERT OLSON, governor of California, for freeing Tom Mooney and for the vigorous part he played in obtaining the liberation of Warren K. Billings.

SENATOR ROBERT WAGNER and **REPRESENTATIVE EDITH NOURSE ROGERS**, for their generous and persistent efforts to gain American shelter for the refugee children of Europe.

ARTHUR EGGLESTON, columnist on the San Francisco *Chronicle*, for his intelligent and progressive treatment of labor issues, and especially for his vigorous fight against California's proposed anti-picketing law.

THE LA FOLLETTE CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE and **SENATOR ELBERT THOMAS**, specifically for their revelations concerning the National Association of Manufacturers and in general for their continuing attack on corporate tyranny in the United States.

FRAZIER SPAULDING and **MORRIS ERNST**, for their services as counsel for the C. I. O. in the Hague case, and **GRENVILLE CLARK** for the splendid brief *amicus curiae* he submitted as chairman of the Civil Liberties Committee of the American Bar Association.

W. CALVIN CHESNUT, judge of the Federal District Court of Baltimore, for his decision requiring the payment of the same wages to Negro teachers as to white; and **THURGOOD MARSHALL**, **WILLIAM H. HASTIE**, **LEON A. RANSOM**, and **W. A. C. HUGHES**, Jr., counsel to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who argued the case.

CAROLINE PRATT, founder of the City and Country School, whose devotion to the principles of progressive education won their acceptance in the reorganization of a number of public schools in New York State.

JOHN STEINBECK, for dramatizing in "The Grapes of Wrath," and **CAREY McWILLIAMS**, for documenting in "Factories in the Field," the desperate plight of the migratory farm worker in California and the political and economic forces arrayed against him.

CARL SANDBURG, for his massive and definitive study of Lincoln and his times, which has now been completed with the publication of "Abraham Lincoln: The War Years."

WILLIAM SAROYAN, for writing "The Time of Your Life," the delightful stage fantasy into which he managed to put all that amused people in his earlier works, and very little that exasperated them.

EDWARD A. DOISY, of St. Louis University, and **LOUIS F. FIESER**, of Harvard University, for the artificial production of Vitamin K, which causes the blood to clot. The two scientists worked independently.

P. J. HANZLIK, **A. J. LEHMAN**, and **A. P. RICHARDSON**, of Stanford University, for their discovery of a bismuth preparation for the treatment of syphilis which can be taken by mouth, thus facilitating cure of the disease and, ultimately, reducing the cost.

Soviet Russia Today

II. FOREIGN POLICY: GENEVA TO HELSINKI

BY LOUIS FISCHER

I HAVE been able to discover no proof—there are plenty of sensational statements—regarding German-Soviet pact negotiations before May, 1939. In December, 1938, talks about commercial credits took place between Moscow and Berlin, but Germany insisted that they had no political significance, and they actually made no progress until months later when the diplomatic rapprochement was under way.

The first hint that led to the Russo-German pact was thrown out by Stalin. Molotov, the Soviet Prime Minister, is authority for that. On August 31, 1939, Molotov reminded the Communist congress in Moscow that on March 10, 1939, "Comrade Stalin posed the question of good-neighbor relations without enmity between Germany and the Soviet Union. It can be seen now that the declarations of Comrade Stalin were, in general, correctly understood by Germany, and that Germany drew political consequences from them." Unsuspected by outsiders and without any announcement, Germany had acted on Stalin's suggestion.

Toward the end of April, 1939, as I then learned from good Soviet sources, Litvinov told the German ambassador in Moscow there was no use even trying to reach a commercial understanding while the press and spokesmen in one country regularly attacked the other.

On May 5, 1939, Maxim Litvinov was dismissed.

In the middle of May Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, said to several highly placed visitors that the Third International no longer played an important role in Soviet foreign policy and that closer relations with Moscow had now become both possible and desirable. On May 28 Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, had a long interview with Marshal Göring, and his report of the meeting is printed in the British Blue Book on the origins of the war. Henderson wrote: "Göring said since France and ourselves [England] could not, and Russia out of self-interest would not, give them [the Poles] any effective military assistance, they would be taught a terrible lesson."

This reflected successful preliminary conversations, but the Germans hesitated; they still hoped to conclude a military alliance with Japan. The Russians pressed the Germans and showed greater eagerness than Hitler to reach an understanding. In June Berlin gave the Kremlin assurances that it had no aggressive intentions against Russia. By July the pourparlers became more serious and

intense. Between August 8 and August 14 the negotiators discussed territorial adjustments and texts.

On August 16 Sir Nevile Henderson reported to Lord Halifax on an interview he had had that day with Baron von Weizsäcker, the German Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs. "I was impressed," Henderson declared, "by one thing, namely, Baron von Weizsäcker's detachment and calm. He seemed very confident, and professed to believe that Russian assistance to the Poles would not only be entirely negligible, but that the U. S. S. R. would even in the end join in sharing the Polish spoils. Nor did my insistence on the inevitability of British intervention seem to move him."

Apparently an agreement already existed between Russia and the Reich on August 16, and it is significant that it was on August 15 that the Kremlin, for the first time, asked the British and French delegates in Moscow for permission to march into Poland and Rumania. The Soviet spokesmen declared that they wished to "make contacts with the Reichswehr"—an enigmatic formula—by advancing into eastern Galicia and into the Vilna corridor as far as Suwalki. The British and French experts advised Moscow to approach Poland and Rumania directly, but promised nevertheless to consult the Poles. After a two-hour interruption of the conference the Soviet representatives returned to announce their refusal to make a direct démarche, and added that if an immediate satisfactory reply from the English and French were not forthcoming they would consider that collaboration with the Allies had been rendered impossible.

It is obvious why Moscow had not applied before August 15 for Polish consent to admit the Red Army. No Polish government could have lasted an hour after granting such consent. Poland could not admit Russian troops because it was afraid they would stay. Whether they came as invaders or saviors changed nothing. Warsaw had adopted the same attitude toward German troops, and in March, 1939, when Hitler in an interview at Berchtesgaden with the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, proposed a joint attack on Russia, Beck refused; the Germans would have had to go through Poland to Russia, and the Polish government feared permanent occupation. The entrance of the Red Army would have split Poland socially. It was politically impossible. Moscow knew this, and had always known it, and did not broach the subject until August 15, when the understanding with Germany

was complete. Russia got from Germany what the Allies could not give.

The secret Moscow-Berlin agreement of August, 1939, allowed Russia to establish itself in Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia, and in Poland as far west as the Vistula. Part of Warsaw would become soviet. No mention was then made of Finland. Lithuania fell within the German sphere. In subsequent military conferences, however, the Russians surrendered part of their Polish zone in exchange for domination over Lithuania. It was only much later that Russia and Germany agreed about Finland.


That there was a pre-war agreement regarding the partition of Poland is clear from Ribbentrop's words at Danzig on October 24, 1939. "When the German army advanced victoriously into Poland," he said, "the English propaganda declared that the Russian army would certainly not participate in the measures against Poland. Instead, the Russian troops, after a very few days, moved forward on the entire front in Poland and occupied Polish territory up to the line of demarcation which we had previously agreed upon with the Russians."

WAS IT SELF-DEFENSE?

Russia is taking advantage of the war in the west to make conquests and to wage its own little wars. But do the new territory in Poland and the naval bases and garrisons in the Baltic states make Russia stronger?

Between 1920 and 1939 Russia enjoyed peace. During that period Germany, England, and France were not involved in war; yet they did not move their armed forces against the Soviet Union, although at certain times in those nineteen years Russia was extremely weak and exposed. In 1919 Germany volunteered to march into Russia to crush the Soviet regime. Marshal Foch demurred—he did not wish Germany to recuperate in Russia. After this present war the Allies, if they win, are likely to adopt the same view for the same reason; if Germany wins, it can only be at the end of a most exhausting struggle in which all the belligerents will have been seriously debilitated. During and after a European war, therefore, Russia would have been in no greater real danger of a Western invasion than at any other time since 1920. This war proves that the contradictions among the capitalist powers have been greater than those between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia.

Moreover, the independence of the Baltic states served as a protection for Russia. They were buffers against attack. If the West decides to make war on Russia, Russia will be more accessible now that it holds the Baltic positions. Czarist Russia had all the Baltic states and more, yet fell an easy prey to German military strength. The Soviet regime has never before put its trust in mere territory or naval bases. Russia's recent territorial acquisitions may prove to be a boomerang. For if Germany ever comes back, the vengeance will be fierce. Russia's



Drawing by LOW

acts have multiplied the number of its enemies many fold and reduced the number of its foreign friends to the lowest possible minimum. The bulk of the working classes of Scandinavia and the Baltic countries and of England, France, and all the Americas has been antagonized. This does not augur well for Russia. A peaceful and stable Soviet Union was not attacked. An expanding Russia might be. Hitler's successes in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Memel have got Germany into a devastating war. I think Stalin's policy toward Germany is bad for Russia, bad for the Soviet government, and bad for the revolution. Russia's new foreign policy is storing up fuel for a future war against Russia. It is poor power politics.

How much hatred for Soviet Russia was neutralized by the popular-front and collective-security policies, by Litvinov's speeches, and by Russia's help to Spain and China can be measured by the vehemence and venom of the reaction against Moscow today. Those who believe that the Soviet war with Finland could provide the capitalist world with an excuse or opportunity for an attack on Russia must agree that Stalin should therefore have kept the peace, for such a joint assault would mean defeat for Russia. Stalin, the circumspect, boasted that he would not pull anybody else's chestnuts from the fire. But you can burn your fingers on your own chestnuts.

The Second World War simply presented Russia with an opportunity to grab. It could not resist the temptation. If the Soviet government had said, "A plague on both your houses; the Allies and the Germans are imperialists and we will have nothing to do with either," its moral position would have been unassailable and all its interests safeguarded. It is the profit taken by a state resting on a non-profit system of society which is objectionable. Once upon a time the Bolsheviks criticized foreign governments for adopting such imperialist measures. There is no difference in principle between British tenure of Gibraltar and Russian occupation of the Estonian islands in the Gulf of Finland or the existence of a Soviet military airfield one mile from the Lithuanian city of Vilna or a Red garrison in that city. To accept the theory that the Baltic states might have been used as springboards for an attack on Russia and therefore had to be swallowed by Russia would mean to imperil the life of every small nation, for Germany or England could similarly contend that Holland and Belgium represent such a danger. To

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argue that Finland was a menace because Leningrad was within range of its artillery is to make a case against the existence of every weak country. Thus German cities are within range of Hungarian air fields: Germany should annex Hungary. This principle could only lead to world anarchy and endless wars. On the same basis, and since at some undetermined date the United States might be attacked from Canada or even from Europe, we ought to annex everything within the flying radius of bombing planes of the future.

To apologize for Russia's attack on Finland by saying that Finland is semi-fascist makes it more difficult to explain Moscow's alleged desire to fight for Poland, which was certainly more reactionary than Finland. If you wage war on semi-fascists why not on fascists? Russia has set up a puppet Soviet regime in Finland and is trying to crush the established national government. Isn't that exactly what Hitler and Mussolini did in Spain?

We are told that collectivized agriculture is better for the peasant in the new Russian section of Poland than the domination of the Polish landlords. I am prepared to agree, although I read with skepticism the dithyrambic greetings sent from the new Soviet provinces to "Father Comrade Stalin" and the ecstatic reports in the Soviet press about the reception given by the Poles and Ukrainians to the Russians. This, however, is the typical excuse of the capitalist imperialists—the fellah is better off because England dominates Egypt. That Mussolini would improve conditions in Abyssinia did not make us defend his war of conquest. Mexico and Central America might benefit by incorporation in the United States.

"CEMENTED IN BLOOD"

How profound is the change in Soviet policy? Is it mere opportunism stimulated by the unique chance to aggrandize, or does it reflect, and deepen, a new Soviet attitude toward world problems and toward political isms in general? This can be judged by Moscow's language. *Pravda* recently charged that the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, had "made provocative speeches before the war between Poland and Germany and—as a result of this—provoked a war with Germany." Poor Nazis! But for Beck's words it would never have occurred to them to attack Poland.

On March 10 Stalin said: "We are in favor of supporting peoples who are fighting for the independence of their countries." There is one word of rebuttal: Finland.

On May 31 Molotov said: "How do we define our tasks in the present international situation? We consider that they are in line with the interests of non-aggressor countries. They consist in checking the further development of aggression." Five months later, on October 31, Molotov said: "Such concepts as 'aggression' and 'aggressor' have acquired a new concrete connotation." "Today," he suggested, "Germany is in the position of

a state that is striving for peace while England and France . . . are opposed to the conclusion of peace." "You see," he added, "the roles are changing." They are indeed. Russia is in a different role. Russia has become an aggressor and sees the world from a new perspective.

And then Finland, the big bully, prepared to attack little defenseless Russia. That is just what Germany said about Poland. In the Nazi press the German invasion of Poland was always called a "counter-attack." The war on Finland is a brutal, unwarranted assault on a small nation which I cannot distinguish from the fascist invasions of Ethiopia, Spain, China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The past and present are the parents of the future. If we draw a line between the past and the present and prolong it, it may give some indication of the general trend. Molotov recently revealed that in the negotiations with Turkey in the autumn Moscow proposed to conclude a mutual-assistance pact with Turkey. A mutual-assistance pact means that if one party is attacked the other comes to its aid. But, declares Molotov, the Soviet government stipulated "that such a pact could not induce it to actions which might draw it into an armed conflict with Germany." Germany is the only exception. Moscow allows nothing to cloud its friendship with the Third Reich.

Molotov had some harsh words for the United States on the same occasion. "The decision of the American government," he stated, "to lift the embargo on arms to belligerent countries raises certain misgivings." Why? "It can scarcely be doubted," he ventured, "that the effect of the decision will be to aggravate and protract" the war. Now American arms will go only to the Allies, not to Germany. If that protracts the war, it means that Russia had expected Germany to win in a short war.

Molotov stated on August 31: "It would be difficult to underestimate the international importance of the Soviet-German treaty. It is a date of historic importance. It marked a turning-point in the history of Europe and not only of Europe." The treaty could have been so important only if it enabled Germany to take Poland without a war or if Germany won the war. Moscow must have foreseen and welcomed both these eventualities.

Stalin was present at the signing of the Russo-German pact. It was the first time that he had attended the signing of a diplomatic document. Since he never does anything without an eye to its political effect, this was a demonstration. It told the world to attach special significance to the treaty. The photographs of the ceremony also tell a story. Stalin looks as if he had performed a trick and was pleased. Molotov too seems to be cynically delighted, and Ribbentrop beams. Stalin's face is more telling than a dozen secret clauses.

The Russo-German pact does not merely record Russia's intention not to fight on the side of the Allies and the resolve of both signatories to refrain from attacking each other. It goes much farther. The Soviet government,

by the text of the treaty, undertakes not to help any victim of German aggression or any country which is helping a victim of German aggression. Stalin has adopted the policy of "non-intervention," which, as he saw in Spain, favors the aggressor. But that is not all. Germany and Russia are to remain "in continuous touch with each other for consultation and in order to inform each other regarding questions which concern their mutual interest." This has often served as the veiled formula for an alliance. Moreover, "neither of the two contracting parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is directly or indirectly directed against the other party of this agreement." That immediately and obviously killed the Franco-Soviet agreement. Strictly interpreted, Russia cannot be a member of any future League of Nations while the pact is valid, which is for ten years at least. "The pact comes into force immediately on its signing." This is not the usual procedure. Nations generally wait until the instrument is ratified. Ratification, the document prescribed, was to take place "within the shortest possible time." Both governments were apparently in a hurry. Germany was poised for an attack on Poland. It started seven days later. Not only the text of the agreement, but the time chosen and the circumstances surrounding it warrant fully the suspicion that this is more than an ordinary non-aggression pact. As Molotov put it on August 31, "the enemies of the pact are the enemies of the Soviet Union and of Germany." The pact then is the keystone of Soviet foreign policy.

Of course, Germany and Russia may quarrel. All states that are friends may quarrel. There is nothing immutable in international relations. Japan and Russia fought a war in 1904. They were allies in 1914. Germany and Italy were allies in 1914. They fought a war in 1915. But for the present, at least, Moscow and Berlin seek to avoid measures which displease the other. They likewise engage in mutual defense. Thus the Bolsheviks do not merely justify their own acts in Poland; they also throw a favorable light on what Germany is doing there. *Izvestia* on October 9, 1939, for instance, stated that "the government of the Soviet Union and the government of Germany undertook the task of establishing peace and order on the territory of the former Poland and to give to peoples inhabiting that territory a peaceful existence which would correspond to their national characteristics." Is this not a good deal to expect from Hitler in view of his record on national minorities? It is novel and instructive to find *Izvestia* uniting Soviet and Nazi conduct in Poland under a single formula. Moscow's own words suggest the existence of a Soviet-Nazi entente. Stalin himself has revealed his view on this subject. When Ribbentrop congratulated him on his sixtieth birthday, Stalin replied: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented in blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm." (Incidentally, whose blood?)

Molotov informed the Supreme Soviet Council on August 31 that "when the German government expressed its desire to improve political relations, the Soviet government had no reason to refuse. That is how the question arose of concluding the non-aggression pact. This stands every former Soviet principle on its head. Soviet policy had always been hostile to bilateral pacts of non-aggression without escape clauses, because they gave liberty of action to the aggressor. If Hitler, having decided to invade one country, signed non-aggression pacts with all other countries, then nobody could assist the victim of aggression. Moscow had therefore repeated for years that bilateral treaties led to war. Stalin's alternative had been collective security, a united front against aggressors. Hitler, on the other hand, pleaded in several Reichstag sessions (May, 1935, for instance) the desirability of bilateral agreements. Stalin has taken the Hitler road.

"WORLD REVOLUTION" MAY BE REACTIONARY

If any further proof of a sharp alteration in Soviet foreign policy were sought it could be found in the new strategy of foreign Communist parties. In May, 1935, France and Russia concluded a treaty of alliance. Accordingly Pierre Laval, the reactionary Premier of France, came to Moscow, and on May 15 he and Stalin, Molotov, and Litvinov issued a joint communiqué which read in part: "M. Stalin understands and fully approves the national-defense policy of France in keeping her armed forces at the level required for security." This was an intimation to the French Communists to drop their opposition to French military budgets (they had previously voted against the building of the Maginot Line). It would not have been logical for the French Communists to endeavor to keep France weak when France was an ally of Soviet Russia. The French Communists adopted a new line. Thereafter and until the signing of the Russo-German pact the Communists in democratic countries tried to cooperate with bourgeois parties. They did not advocate world revolution. They preached an alliance with democracy. They served many liberal causes with devotion and good effect. What has happened now? The French Communists, who began to support French military preparations when Stalin signed a pact with Laval, began to oppose them when Stalin signed a pact with Hitler. The British and other Communist parties followed suit. On September 3 Harry Pollitt, secretary of the British Communist Party, published a penny pamphlet entitled "How to Win the War," in which he wrote that although the war was of course an imperialist war, nevertheless, "to stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only revolutionary-sounding phrases while the fascist beasts ride roughshod over Europe, would be a betrayal of everything our forebears have fought to achieve in the course of long years of struggle against

capitalism." Then new instructions reached party leaders abroad contradicting everything they had said in the popular-front period and even what they said after August 23. The Communists thereupon condemned the anti-Nazi war and are now urging a cessation of hostilities.

Plainly the Communists' pacifist and world-revolutionary slogans can only be designed to undermine morale in England and France; in England their propaganda is unrestricted by official interference and in France they carry on despite it, whereas the Gestapo had reduced the effectiveness of German Communist anti-Hitler agitation to an insignificant minimum. Moreover, I am not at all sure that Communists in Germany will not conduct patriotic German propaganda, for is not Germany fighting Great Britain, which has suddenly become Russia's public enemy No. 1 (this honor was once held by France, later by Germany and Japan), and are not Germany and the Socialist fatherland warm friends? German Communists are returning from Russia to Germany under a promise of immunity. The Communist Party of the United States has discontinued its economic boycott of Germany. It is still boycotting Japan, however. There is as yet no agreement between Moscow and Japan on China, and the united front between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek remains. But if the new world-revolu-

tionary strategy should require the Chinese Communists to desert Chiang Kai-shek and intrench themselves in provinces contiguous to Siberia—where Moscow could establish a protectorate over them—Chiang Kai-shek would be weakened, and the occupation of a large zone in China by Japanese imperialism would be facilitated.

Thus it becomes clear that the world revolution, which sounds so radical, has reactionary implications. That is dialectical, too. There is nothing in common between the world revolution and Russia's recent conquistatorial acts, which have alienated the working classes of Western countries and left others confused and dismayed. The cause of world labor is not identical with that of Russian territory. The methods of conquest employed by Moscow and the lies about "Finnish aggression" are counter-revolutionary in their effect. Stalin's photograph with Ribbentrop is the finest counter-revolutionary propaganda. If Stalin had been thinking of the world revolution or of the work of foreign Communist parties, he would not have posed for his picture with a leading fascist. He did not have to do it.

[The concluding article of Mr. Fischer's series, dealing with internal developments in the Soviet Union which have paved the way for the drastic change in foreign policy, will appear next week.]

America's Stake in Britain's War

BY FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

THE seven blind men of the Hindu legend who sought to describe the elephant by feeling its parts could come to no agreement as to the nature of the beast. The problem which they faced was less difficult than that which the citizens of the United States, giddy-minded and sober-minded alike, are meeting in their efforts to comprehend the issues of "other people's wars" and the interest of America therein.

The chief obstacle to clarity of vision lies in the unpredictability of human events in a world given over to international anarchy. The first curse of anarchy, as Thomas Hobbes observed some centuries ago, is that every man is the enemy of every man and that life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. The world's tragedy gives testimony. The second curse of anarchy is that none knows what dangers the morrow will bring, and life becomes a perilous experiment based upon doubtful assumptions about an unknowable future. America's dilemma bears witness. Could the outcome of the present war be foretold, it would probably not have to be fought. Overt tests of power are necessary only when the balance of forces is in doubt. And anyone who

could predict the verdict of Mars could with the greatest of ease prescribe an American foreign policy.

The quarrel at home over American interests in the world of 1940 is not a quarrel over conflicting loves and hates or over irreconcilable demands, but only over divergent expectations. All Americans want "peace" and "prosperity." All want "democracy," "freedom," and "justice," both in American society and in the society of nations. Whether the goods thus named can ever again be had depends upon the design of world politics which is being blindly woven by the embattled hosts abroad. The means of having them, if they can still be had, is obscured by the haze of dubious combat which spreads from Shansi to Lapland and from the Westwall to all the seaways of the globe. Amid a chaos of guesses and slogans, all without meaning save in terms of coming consequences of current acts, the despairing seeker after certainty may well echo Alice's wistful question—"whether you *can* make words mean so many different things." Humpty Dumpty's contemptuous retort is still the best reply: "The question is which is to be Master —that's all."

Every war is a struggle for mastery, whether it be called a quest for empire or a crusade for righteousness. Every world war is a struggle for mastery of the world. America has been inextricably a part of the Western world since Europeans wrested it from the Indians. America has therefore been willy-nilly involved in every world war of the last three hundred years. The solution of the problem of power posed by each conflict was long in doubt, as it is now. But the alternatives presented are not wholly novel. In the tumult and shouting of the moment many forget that the broad pattern of *Weltpolitik*, writ large across North Atlantic civilization, has exhibited astonishingly little change since Elizabeth's seamen defeated the Armada and Europe's first great clash of ideologies drove the first refugees to these shores.

That pattern is one of successive efforts on the part of the most powerful Continental power to emulate ancient Rome in unifying Europe and the world by the sword. Each such effort has ultimately been thwarted by a coalition of rivals and victims who have stubbornly preferred independence to the blessings of enforced unity. The decisive component in each such coalition has always been the insular "nation of shopkeepers." An England lacking large land forces and Continental bases has never been able to partition or annex Continental powers. But an England possessing preponderant sea power has been able to acquire the lion's share of Africa, Asia, and Oceania, and to buy off or defeat each Continental aspirant to hegemony, from Hapsburgs and Bourbons to Bonapartes and Hohenzollerns.

These practices of Albion are attributable neither to vice nor to virtue but to geography and business. Britain's rulers have viewed every would-be Continental conqueror as a threat to British security and a menace to the far-flung markets without which England would die. They have welcomed every ally willing to serve their interests on British terms. And they have seldom hesitated to "sell out" allies no longer useful. The net result of British victories in former world wars has been to preserve a state system of rival sovereignties with the strongest always held in check by coalitions of the weak.

From the beginning of America's independent existence this result has been taken for granted by Americans, most of all when they have been least conscious of it. Having failed to conquer Canada in 1812, the United States ceased playing the power game against Britain. Having realized that Canada was vulnerable, Britain reciprocated. The unique features of Anglo-American relations since the Treaty of Ghent have no parallels in the relations between any other two powers. They derive less from a common tongue and common cultural values than from geography and business. Each nation has always been the best customer of the other. Each nation has looked to the other for support in the power

game. The new British Empire was made in America. The Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door were made in England. American isolationism and Anglophobia have flourished only when British naval supremacy and British ability to keep Europe safely divided into rival camps were not in question. America has used Britain as a defense against Continental conquerors potentially dangerous to the United States. Britain has used America to redress the European balance whenever it has been in danger of fundamental disturbance. In 1917 America came to Britain's defense when British defeat was threatened. Under similar circumstances America will again come to Britain's defense if past definitions of national interests persist.

The central issue of American foreign policy is nothing less than the issue of whether America can safely expose itself to the risks resulting from possible British defeat at the hands of a new corporal turned Caesar. If the danger does not arise, no choice will need to be made beyond that already made in the revision of the neutrality legislation. But should Britain face disaster at the hands of Hitler and/or Stalin in consequence of the tragic blunders of Tory appeasers during the past eight years, America must either take up arms against Britain's enemies or confront a changed world in which for the first time the principal obstacle to the military unification of Europe will be gone and the bulwark between America and the Continental powers will be demolished. All other decisions in American diplomacy hinge upon this decision, since all problems of world power revolve around England's destiny.

In support of the view that Britain's fate need not concern Americans to the point of intervention, certain assumptions about the future can readily be made. A triumphant Reich may turn against Russia. A Europe torn by German-Russian conflict will not threaten America. Or a victorious Germany, aided by Russia, Italy, Spain, and Japan, may become wholly occupied for years or decades with the partition and exploitation of the British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial empires in Africa and Asia, leaving America in safe and splendid isolation. Or a coalition of aggressors, having mastered three continents, may become satiated and leave America in peace because of the risks and costs of challenging the great power of the West. A unified Europe, albeit united by the sword, might become a stable and prosperous Europe offering economic opportunities rather than political threats to America. In any of these contingencies the defeat and dissolution of the British Empire would present few dangers to the United States.

On the other hand, a different set of consequences, equally possible and far less reassuring, may well flow from the long-predicted fall of Britain. Naval hegemony in all the seaways outside the Western Hemisphere will pass to the victors. The world's new masters will pre-

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sumably continue to stand for autarchy in international trade and for anarchy in international politics. A German-Japanese alliance or a German-Russian-Japanese alliance could readily complete the conquest of China and drive America from the western Pacific. A world dominated by the totalitarian economies may be a world in which most American foreign trade will vanish. Whether the military security of the United States could be seriously threatened under any of these circumstances appears doubtful. Symbols, however, are also weapons of conquest. The prestige value of the triumphant totalitarian ideologies, coupled with widespread deprivations and insecurities throughout the Western Hemisphere, might well destroy the democratic way of life—first in Latin America and later within the United States itself. A militarized totalitarian America could readily survive as a great power in a totalitarian world. In all probability a democratic America could not.

These alternative prospects impose certain imperatives upon all participants in the great debate on what American policy should be. Isolationists would do well to talk less of the sins of Anglo-French imperialism, which are well known, and to think more of the probable impact upon American security and American democracy of a victory of German, Japanese, and Russian imperialisms over Anglo-French imperialism. Interventionists might profitably devote less attention to the crimes of Berlin, Moscow, Rome, and Tokyo, which are

also well known, and give more thought to the future shape of Anglo-American relations as the foundation of a new commonwealth of states. What risks of tomorrow are Americans prepared to run for the sake of avoiding involvement in today's war? What new price for security are Americans prepared to pay if the security hitherto afforded by the British fleet is gone? What obligations are Americans prepared to assume for the sake of preserving the security they have hitherto enjoyed? What, if anything, do they propose to do to stop Hitler and Stalin in Europe and the Japanese war machine in Asia? If they are indisposed to do anything effective, what form do they propose to give to acquiescence in a possible totalitarian victory and to their future relations with the victors? And if such a victory is prevented, what responsibilities, if any, are Americans prepared to assume to reconstruct a liberal world economy devoted to welfare and not to power and a liberal world polity resting on cooperation and consent and not on violence?

Until these questions are discussed much more frankly than is now the case, until provisional answers are found which can command general support and serve as guides to Washington, American foreign policy must remain a muddle, dangerous alike for America and for the rest of the world. Answers found soon will shorten the sufferings of millions, for the decisions to be made in many capitals will depend upon calculations as to American decisions. Answers found late may be found too late.

Death of a Newspaper

BY GEORGE W. MCGILL

Chattanooga, December 23

TEN days before Christmas the Chattanooga *News* was forced to suspend publication after more than fifty-one years as an afternoon daily. The action was the result of an agreement between a combination of majority bondholders and preferred stockholders of the Chattanooga *News* Company and Roy McDonald, publisher of the Chattanooga *Free Press*, the paper's bitterly anti-New Deal competitor. The deal called for the sale of "certain assets" of the *News* to the *Free Press* on condition that the *News* cease publication immediately. This squeeze-out was vigorously opposed by both the management of the *News* and its 150 employees. All proposals made by George Fort Milton, president and general manager of the *News*, and a committee of employees were ignored. Protests by organized labor leaders representing both the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. went unheeded.

The opportunity to crush the *News* was presented by a

technical default in payment of bond obligations which made possible an order by holders of a majority of the bonds for foreclosure against the paper's physical assets, although it was admitted that except for its \$325,000 bonded-debt burden the *News* was in better financial condition than the *Free Press*. George Fort Milton's stepmother, Mrs. Abby Crawford Milton, and her three children controlled the majority of the bonds and preferred stock of the Chattanooga *News* Company. George Fort Milton, Sr., had been president and editor of the *News* from 1908 until his death in 1924, and his will designated his son to succeed him and to control the policies of the paper. In order to insure this, he bequeathed to Milton, Jr., sufficient stock, both outright and as trustee, to give him control. In 1928 Milton and Walter C. Johnson, then general manager and vice-president of the *News*, contracted with Mrs. Milton to buy, at \$295 a share, the stock owned by Mrs. Milton and her minor children and also the stock held by Milton as trustee.

Milton's figures show that from 1928 to 1936 Mrs. Milton and her children received more than \$400,000 in cash and securities.

In 1936 Milton and Johnson, to remove the personal obligations against them incurred in the deal with Mrs. Milton, agreed to a plan for increasing the bonded indebtedness of the company from \$120,000 to \$325,000 and for enlarging the preferred-stock issues from \$100,000 to \$150,000. Most of the new bond and stock issue was given to Mrs. Milton to wipe out the rest of the notes which Milton and Johnson had signed individually. It was through Mrs. Milton's control of the majority of the securities and the combination of her interests with those of minority stockholders that control was wrested from Milton and the fate of the *News* decided.

The underlying cause of the paper's extinction had little to do with its finances; it lay rather in the editorial policies which had made the Chattanooga *News* one of the most liberal dailies in the South. Its crusade for public power in Chattanooga, the last major fight waged by the *News*, was what probably spelled its doom. It had previously championed the fight for woman suffrage, and had long pressed for reform in city, county, and state government. It had exposed rackets and vigorously condemned lynching. It had demanded that the underprivileged be given a fair opportunity and the rights of labor be recognized. President Roosevelt and the New Deal received the support of the *News*, and, what was perhaps most important, the Tennessee Valley Authority program was publicized fully and favorably.

Chattanooga's fight for public power was started in 1934 and reached its climax in March, 1935, when the voters decided by nearly three to one that the city should issue bonds to build or acquire its own power-distribution system. The *News* was the only Chattanooga paper that supported public power, and every member of its editorial staff took part in the fight. The referendum did not end the struggle, and the *News* carried the battle on until the sale of the Commonwealth and Southern properties to the TVA ended the controversy last summer.

The public-power battle turned many local business interests against the *News* and induced them to encourage and give aid to the *Free Press*, which started as a shopping guide for Roy McDonald's chain of grocery stores, later became a weekly sheet, then a semi-weekly, and finally a daily in September, 1936. Testimony introduced before the Congressional Committee to Investigate the TVA showed that the Tennessee Electric Power Company withdrew all its advertising from the *News* and advertised heavily with the *Free Press* at higher rates than were paid by others.

For two years before the death of the *News* on December 19, various injurious rumors had been circulated concerning the paper. But it was not until December 1

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of this year that employees were advised officially of the critical situation. When Milton told them the facts as he knew them, they acted immediately and vigorously. A *News* Employees' Committee was formed, composed of representatives from the various departments. Through the committee the workers took it upon themselves to raise the \$15,000 needed to make up the bond default and to contribute 20 per cent of their salaries to buy stock in the *News* and thus make available weekly deposits with the trustee sufficient to take care of the indebtedness as it matured. The management agreed that this contribution should continue as long as the Employees' Committee considered it necessary. Since the paper's volume of business had increased steadily over a period of fourteen months and for the past few months it had actually been in the black, it was expected that these sacrifices would not have to be made over a long period.

The \$15,000 was raised quickly. Friends of the *News* and friends of the employees responded with cash, checks, and notes ranging in amount from \$25 to \$1,500. Many of the workers sold their cars, mortgaged their homes and furniture, or borrowed on their life insurance to contribute to the fund.

The climax of the employees' efforts came on the night of December 2 when seventy-five of them called on the persons who seemed responsible for the situation to ask them to give the *News* a chance to continue operations under the employees' plan or at least to grant a stay of execution. Wearing the rough clothes in which they had done their day's work and with ink smudges on their hands and faces, they drove in sleet and rain over the serpentine highway which leads up historic Lookout Mountain to the home of Mrs. Abby Milton's daughter. Some of them, men who had been with the *News* for more than twenty-five years and had worked for the elder Milton, made personal appeals to his widow. She insisted, however, that she was powerless to act and that she was not responsible for the situation which had arisen.

The employees went next to the home of Sam J. McAllester, Mrs. Milton's attorney. McAllester has been active in Republican politics and is secretary of the Home Stores, Inc., the grocery chain of which Roy McDonald, publisher of the *Free Press*, is president. He received the *News* representatives courteously and praised their spirit of cooperation and efforts to save the paper, but told them nothing could be done inasmuch as the sale agreement had already been signed and only a few formalities remained to be done to consummate the transaction. He said persons with money were willing to back the *Free Press* if only one afternoon newspaper were left in the field, but they were unwilling to invest in the *News*.

It was a gloomy procession which wound its way back down the mountain through the fog. But the men were not ready to surrender. They asked the trustee to take the \$15,000 they had raised and to give them assurance

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that the *News* would continue to operate. The conditions were not acceptable, however, and the money was returned to the donors. The fight was lost.

"But the spirit of the *News*," wrote Alfred D. Mynders, the paper's veteran editorial writer, "is not going to die, and certainly no one in the *News* family is today in the mood to salute any Caesars." The people of Chattanooga, he added, "will keep that spirit alive and some day

they may even demand a paper like the *News* to voice their hopes and aspirations."

Public indignation was expressed over the freezing-out of the paper, and even some of the minority bondholders were displeased. Already there are reports that after the first of the year the public demand will be satisfied and that the *News*—under another name—will rise phoenix-like from the ashes.

Writers in the Wilderness

II. JOHN DOS PASSOS

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

THE career of John Dos Passos might well be the subject of one of the biographies which form a segment of "U. S. A." He was born in the middle of America in 1896 just as finance capitalism was beginning to hit its stride across the land of opportunity. His grandfather had been a Portuguese immigrant to the New World, a shoemaker in Philadelphia. His father was a drummer boy in the Civil War, which gave the country to the northern industrialists and increased the reservoir of "free" labor by several million blacks. By the time he was born his father was a corporation lawyer in a land of corporations whose quiet golden voice outweighed the silver tongue of Bryan at least sixteen to one. His mother stemmed from the stock of Maryland and the Old Dominion, where Jefferson, the slaveholder, had paradoxically espoused the ideal of equalitarian democracy. From one of those fusions of racial and cultural strains in which the melting-pot has been so rich came an American with the name of John Roderigo Dos Passos.

He was born in Chicago, but he began traveling at an early age. He lived in the Northern Neck of Virginia, in Washington, D. C., in England, where he also went to school. His later education was at the Choate School and Harvard, where he graduated in 1916. He wrote for the *Dial*, aesthetic advance guard of the period, and wanted to study architecture. He sailed for Spain for that purpose in 1916, but turned up in Paris in 1917 studying instead the architecture of history, which was being basically altered at the time in the World War. He has been working at it ever since.

He drove an ambulance during the war, and his first book came out of that experience, not "Three Soldiers" but "One Man's Initiation," published in England in 1920. It was the militant, questioning book of a very young man learning to write.

"Three Soldiers" was published in America in 1921. It showed a great advance in writing and in thinking.

Coningsby Dawson in the *New York Times* denounced it as a story told "brutally with calculated sordidness and a blind whirlwind of rage which respects neither the reticences of art nor the restraints of decency." Today it seems mild enough; then it was called by the *Independent* the "Main Street" of the war, which serves to remind us of the outraged protest that greeted Lewis's exposé of Gopher Prairie.

After the war Dos Passos extended his travels. Spain, the Near East, Mexico. His next book, "Rosinante to the Road Again," was the first of three such books that have punctuated more than two decades. He took the world for his province at an early age and has covered more of it than most people. Endowed with an extraordinary sensory apparatus, he has set down the sights, sounds, smells of a dozen countries with such vividness and immediacy that the words themselves seem like colors, noises, odors; but these books also contain the itinerary, with milestones, of the emotional and intellectual research of a man of conscience, deliberately extending and deepening his awareness, determined to confront all the complexities and contradictions of contemporary human experience. They show his progression from the eloquent and sometimes rhetorical description of far countries to an ever-deepening concern with the social and human landscape at home and abroad, and they reflect the author's experience, as observer or participant, of the wars of his generation—from the struggle to save the lives of Sacco and Vanzetti to the civil war in Spain. Excerpts from the three books were published in 1938 under the title "Journeys Between Wars." From each of his journeys he has returned to confront America, as novelist, with a tough faith in the vague but undeniable promise of American life and a determined disillusion with its specific broken promises; they have combined to generate the energy and will to produce a 1,400-page trilogy of the American scene, as well as other books, plays, pamphlets, and many articles.

After his last journey—to Spain, France, and England—Dos Passos said farewell to Europe, as far as its power politics are concerned. Europe includes Stalin's Russia, where Dos Passos has been popular as a "proletarian" novelist. The October Revolution had filled him, as it had many others, with a driving hope; its perversion into a totalitarian dictatorship turned that hope to disillusion. But he thinks that America may be able to discover indigenous methods of attaining a just social order. In the *Partisan Review* for Summer, 1939, he voiced the opinion he had expressed two years earlier in *Common Sense* on his return to America:

I think there is enough real democracy in the very mixed American tradition to enable us, with courage and luck, to weather the social transformations that are now going on without losing our liberties or the humane outlook that is the medium in which civilizations grow. The reaction to home-bred ways of thinking is a healthy defense against the total bankruptcy of Europe.

Dos Passos's main journey between two major wars and innumerable smaller ones has been an unprecedented literary exploration of the American scene. His findings are contained in "Manhattan Transfer" (1925); the trilogy "U. S. A." made up of "The 42nd Parallel" (1930), "Nineteen Nineteen" (1932), and "The Big Money" (1936); and "Adventures of a Young Man" (1939), which also incorporates his farewell to Europe.

Two books—a volume of indifferent verse, "The Pushcart at the Curb," and an inferior novel, "Streets of Night"—were published in 1922 and 1923, respectively, but "Manhattan Transfer," which is in a sense a prologue to "U. S. A." in both subject matter and style, marked the beginning of what he calls "straight writing." In an introduction to the Modern Library Edition of "Three Soldiers" in 1932 he defined his method and his objective:

I think there is such a thing as straight writing. A cabinetmaker enjoys cutting a dovetail because he's a cabinetmaker; every type of work has its own vigor inherent in it. The mind of a generation is its speech. A writer makes aspects of that speech enduring by putting them in print. He whittles at the words and phrases of today and makes of them forms to set the mind of tomorrow's generation. That's history. A writer who writes straight is the architect of history.

What I'm trying to get out is the difference in kind between the work of James Joyce, say, and that of any current dispenser of daydreams. . . . Joyce is working with speech straight and so dominating the machine of production, while the daydream artist is merely feeding the machine. . . .

His preoccupation with speech comes out again in the brief preface to the Modern Library edition of "U. S. A." (1939), which ends, "But mostly U. S. A. is the speech of the people." He has done a conscientious job of putting the speech of this generation in print. His tool chest contains a huge vocabulary and a multiplicity of charac-

ters collected from every stratum of American life. His novels, like his travel books, contain much color and sound. On the very first page of "Manhattan Transfer" is an incidental but typical example of his onomatopoeic gift with words: ". . . men and women press through the manuresmelling wooden tunnel to the ferry-house, crushed and jostling like apples fed down a chute into a press." The italicized phrase makes the very sound of apples in a press. In his "whittling" at words and phrases he has made new joinings and given old phrases a fresh look, sometimes so fresh that the reader does not recognize them at first. When I first came on "chipontheshoulder" I wanted to pronounce the *th* hard as in "Iolanthe." The phrase-word happens in this case to be a good brief description of a policeman, though it would be clearer with hyphens. Often his "cabinet work" is superficial and puzzling rather than organic and revealing. "U. S. A." as everybody knows, is divided into four segments. The Camera Eye is autobiographical; Newsreel gives the external setting; the brief biographies of important Americans provide the moral and historical perspective. All three make up the background against which the numerous fictional characters move. They are drawn from every walk of life; they are connected only by chance. The principle of unity in the book is the impact upon the characters, including the great Americans and the author, of a social system whose main values are money and respectability.

"U. S. A." reflects both the unflinching disillusion and the persistent renewal I have already mentioned as the driving forces in Dos Passos's attitude. Roughly speaking, these two attitudes are projected, respectively, in his fictional characters, who are typically "little people" overtaken and defeated by one or another manifestation of the "system," and in his "great Americans." John Chamberlain, in an interesting brochure on Dos Passos published last spring, asks whether, by the juxtaposition of the will-less common man and the dedicated great, the author is not "trying to tell us, without becoming didactic and destroying himself as a novelist, that the 'little man' is damned because something (call it 'Fate,' call it the 'system,' call it what you will) comes between him and opportunity to use the product of the brains of the great." This is probably Dos Passos's intention, and I would not quarrel with the thesis. But certain unplanned effects make his demonstration less convincing than it should be.

Three of his characters, one real and big, two fictional and little, will serve to illustrate—Debs in "U. S. A." and Jimmy Herf and Ellen Thatcher in "Manhattan Transfer." All are thwarted by the "system." But of the two fictional characters Ellen is for me alive, Jimmy is not; and in her own way, despite Dos Passos's thesis, Ellen shares with Debs and others of the "great Americans" the resilience and will that the Jimmy Herfs and the Charley Andersons lack.

The answer seems to me twofold. First, the demonstration of the thesis, as far as Jimmy Herf or Charley Anderson is concerned, does tend to be didactic, and sentimental as well. The difference between Ellen and Jimmy in Dos Passos's characterization of them is, to put it rather crudely, that Ellen in spite of everything says yes to life; Jimmy has no said for him. And Ellen is the more convincing, because even "little people," under capitalism or any other system, are not quite so miserable as Dos Passos forces them to be, if only because ignorance and the self-preserving impulse to rationalization keep from them the ultimate and self-destroying knowledge, which Dos Passos possesses, that they are once and for all defeated. In particular his men tend to be creatures of his own intellectual disillusion to whom he allows none of his own persistent hope. As a result their small tragedies lack the tragic sense, and as characters they fail to come to life. His women, on the other hand, often do come to life; in these cases they transcend the pattern; but by this very fact they show his real power of characterization once it works free of an imposed design.

Too often, and this is the second part of the answer, Dos Passos reports rather than creates character. Innumerable details of speech, circumstance, setting are put down, sometimes to the point of monotony and sometimes, since the details are often similar, to the point where the characters run together in the reader's mind. Dos Passos tends toward the generalized rather than the significant detail. For the most part he has been unable to create in his fictional characters the illusion of life which is already there to be reported in his real characters. But occasionally the report gets up and walks, and most often it is an Ellen, a Margo Dowling, or an Eleanor Stoddard. It would be foolish to assume that Dos Passos considers American women superior in the sense of life, if only because it is so strong in his characterizations of great Americans. The key seems to lie rather in his attitude toward such characters as Jimmy Herf. His pity for them is clear and conscious. As John Chamberlain says, his pity is sometimes wasted. But what devitalizes them is not pity but a condescension, no doubt unconscious, on the part of the author which is communicated to the reader. Toward Ellen and even toward Margo Dowling, on the other hand, he maintains and communicates that attitude of wonder never quite dispelled which makes one fundamental difference between invented and created character.

"U. S. A." demonstrates Dos Passos's extraordinary capacity for observation; his "scholarship" in this respect is amazing; the sheer bulk and variety of his reading as reflected in both the biographies and the fictional sections have been tremendous. The work as a whole is one of the most impressive performances in contemporary writing. Yet one cannot say, "Here is the essence of American life." One can say rather that here in parallel columns is

a pretty complete report of the human and social elements of American life from which the essence might be distilled. Eventually, however, the reading of parallel columns becomes monotonous. In the end one tends, in self-defense, to read the fictional column out of order.

What is more serious, one grows to feel that the multiple device is a substitute for integration on the part of the author; the autobiographical Camera Eye does not fulfil what might have been its catalytic function.

His latest book, "The Adventures of a Young Man," is refreshingly free of devices. In comparison with "U. S. A." it is a minor work; and among other things it

reveals to what extent the life of "U. S. A." depends upon the biographies of great Americans which form its most enduring segment. But if "The Adventures" fails, at least it is a move in the direction of integration of both style and content, which seems to me to be Dos Passos's primary problem as a novelist. Its theme, moreover, indicates an advance from reporting to analysis; in this book Dos Passos comes closer to functioning as the "architect of history" he aspires to be rather than a carpenter of style preoccupied with the inadequate theory that "mostly U. S. A. is the speech of the people."

"The Adventures of a Young Man" appeared at a time when it was still fashionable to defend the Soviet Union as a socialist state. With exceptions it was pounced upon as merely a fictionized account of the Stalinist-Trotskyist feud by both sides to the dispute, partly because both its critics and its defenders wished to use it as a stick with which to beat their enemies, partly, I think, because the Stalinists have hammered so hard on the patent lie that every left critic of Stalinism is a Trotskyite that the lie has been accepted even by intelligent people, and partly because of the weaknesses of the book itself. At any rate its real theme got little attention. This theme, broadly speaking, is the main problem of our day—the problem of achieving the "better world" of socialism without setting up a "bureaucratic machine for anti-human power," run by an "iron combination of men . . . who have only one idea binding them together, to hold on to what they've got" (I quote from Dos Passos in other contexts) and abetted by a fanaticism as cruel as that of the Inquisition. This is no sectarian issue.

The theme is developed through the account of the "adventures" of Glenn Spotswood, an American who is



John Dos Passos

led by his social convictions into the Communist Party and out again into independent radicalism. He is labeled a Trotskyite by his former comrades, and when he finds his way to Spain to fight for the republic he is imprisoned and then sent to certain death. He is not merely a rival sectarian, but an independent radical who rejects Moscow and what it stands for.

The book does not do artistic justice to its theme. In the section dealing with the miners' struggle Glenn Spotswood takes on the proportions of a full-bodied character. Thereafter the tension of the writing slackens, the character of Glenn shrinks to the proportions of the subject of a case history, and the theme tends to become imprisoned in the case history, which is brought too quickly to its fatal close. In a less bitter external setting the book might at least have received the credit it deserves for its convincing analysis of the process by which honest fanatics manipulated by unscrupulous "iron men" arrive at the state of mind in which the death of a nonconformist becomes not only necessary but right. At a time when this state of mind has taken possession not only of the most patently reactionary sectors of human thought but of groups in a position to influence revolutionary thought, such an analysis can hardly be cried down as sectarian or cynical or as evidence of "a growing disaffection with the whole radical movement," that is, reactionary.

In the preface to "Three Soldiers" quoted above Dos Passos went on to say:

These years of confusion, when everything has to be relabeled and catchwords lose their meaning from week to week, may be the reader's poison, but they are the writer's meat. Today, though the future may not seem so gaily colored or full of clanging hopes as it was thirteen years ago . . . we can at least meet events with our minds cleared of some of the romantic garbage that kept us from doing clear work then. Those of us who have lived through have seen these years strip the bunting off the great illusions of our time; we must deal with the raw structure of history now, we must deal with it quick, before it stamps us out.

Dos Passos's exposure of fanaticism and power politics on the left is only one more of his conscientious attempts to "meet events with our minds cleared . . . of romantic garbage." The "garbage" includes the brand of thinking on the left which, armed with the slogan that the end justifies the means, has in the last decade effectually gutted the socialist idea of both its morals and its morale.

As a political thinker Dos Passos can be charged with having reached the intellectual impasse of many intelligent Americans who have not found the answer to the question how to achieve a socialist economy without sacrificing the "capitalist" Bill of Rights. As novelist he is not required to give the answer. What one does hope for are more characters, "big" or "little," as convincing and significant as the real ones he has given us, including his own.

[The third article of this series will appear soon.]

Everybody's Business

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

The Uncertain Forties

WE HAVE said a glad goodby to the thin thirties, and it would be pleasant to predict with assurance that the forties will be fat, at least by contrast. Unhappily, there is very little solid basis for such optimism or, indeed, for any long-range forecast at all. The only certainty in the present situation is uncertainty. Abroad, a war "the end of which no man can foresee"; at home, an unresolved struggle to overcome the contradictions of capitalism within a capitalist framework. Under these circumstances it is well to eschew any attempt to look far into the new decade and to confine one's gaze to the immediate future.

But before considering the prospects of 1940 it is worth while to take a backward glance at 1939. The past twelve months have been a period of definite but rather halting progress. At the beginning of the year the recovery which set in about the middle of 1938 seemed already to have lost its impetus, and in the early spring there was an actual recession, accentuated by the prolonged stoppage in the coal fields. But in June industry started to move forward once again, despite the mounting fears of war, and when the conflict actually began it proved an unexpectedly vigorous tonic for American business.

The first weeks of September saw a speculative bonfire in commodity markets, which soon burned itself out, and a huge increase in orders for industrial goods. The spurt in buying was directly traceable to the belief that a tremendous demand for goods from the warring countries would rapidly develop. This was soon shown to be an illusion; nevertheless, industrial activity continued to increase almost to the end of the year.

The expansion of business during the past four months appears, therefore, to have been a quickening of a domestic movement already under way when the war started rather than an incipient war boom. The effect on industrial production is shown by the rise of the Federal Reserve Board's index, which was 92 in May and 103 in August, to 124 in November. The December figure is expected to show a further slight improvement. This means that industrial goods are now being produced at a rate rather higher than the average for 1929. But even if this rate is sustained over the next twelve months, we shall be far from the prosperity of that fabulous year, for today production has to support a population at least eight million greater. Moreover, industry is only one sector of the economic front. It does not include building and construction, which are most important factors in the creation of wealth and employment, and recovery in this field has been much less impressive, with the October index of contracts awarded only 77 compared with a 1929 average of 117.

It is clear, then, that if 1939 has put us once again on the road to recovery, we have still a long way to go before we can claim to have refound prosperity. Nor do official forecasters appear confident that the pace of the past few

months can be sustained. A recent survey by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics declared that, while the average level of 1940 business would be higher than the 1939 average, it seemed certain that the rate of gain shown in the second half of last year would not be maintained. This authority, however, does not expect any serious recession unless the inventory position gets out of hand. On this subject there is a good deal of difference of opinion. Some authorities believe that an appreciable part of the recent additional output of goods has not passed into actual consumption; others assert that stocks have increased only in proportion to the advance in consumer sales. One favorable factor is that there has been no general increase in prices comparable to the movement which checked consumption, encouraged speculative accumulation of goods, and resulted in the inventory crisis of 1937.

The danger of production outstripping domestic consumption and real investment is certainly one to be guarded against, as Secretary of Commerce Hopkins pointed out in his year-end statement. The political auguries suggest that the net contribution of the government to purchasing power is going to decline in the current year, and as a result a larger share of the burden of new investment will fall on private enterprise. Whether the latter is prepared to accept the load is another matter. The volume of new capital financing, though showing a small increase in recent weeks, is still at a very low ebb. Wall Street men tend to blame the SEC and other government agencies for this fact, but before the investment bankers can launch an issue, some industrialist must conceive a plan for which money will be needed.

At present the birth rate of capital-using plans is rising very slowly, although the new records achieved week after week in electric-power production offer hope of utility expansion. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, preliminary construction budgets for this industry allow for an expenditure of upward of half a million dollars during the year, with a possibility that a figure of \$600,000,000 may be attained. This would compare with a 1939 estimated total of \$480,000,000. If the railroads maintain their present traffics, further steps toward overcoming maintenance arrears are possible. In the housing and general construction field, however, it does not at present seem likely that increased activity by private enterprise will do more than offset the expected fall in federal contracts.

For those who believe in the barometric infallibility of the Stock Exchange, the most depressing feature of the current situation is the extreme apathy of that institution. Since its brief spasm of excitement in September nothing has been able to move it. News of increasing production, sharply rising profits, handsome dividends have left it completely indifferent; even the recent speculative revival in the commodity markets has proved uninfectious. In Wall Street rapid changes in market atmosphere are always possible, and the New Year may see a sudden swing from stormy to set fair. But present behavior of the Exchange certainly suggests a complete lack of faith in the ability of business to maintain its present level of production and profits. This attitude may itself serve to restrain enterprise in general, for Wall Street not only reflects the state of confidence objectively but is also one of the subjective factors in its determination.

In the Wind

IN A DISPATCH from an anonymous Boston correspondent Father Coughlin's *Social Justice* reports that "citizen groups trained in the use of arms to cooperate with police in putting down subversive uprisings" are quietly emerging throughout New England. The dispatch asserts that "rifle clubs are being organized under the supervision of local police officials to assist in quelling any revolutionary disturbance." "Efficient units," it continues, already exist in Belmont and Arlington, with more to come.

ALL A. R. P. POSTS in the Paddington district of London recently received a telegraphed message from the Home Office. Posted throughout the area exactly as it had been received, the message read: "Please note that the provision of females for wardens will cease as from tonight under Home Office instructions." Some hours later "females" was crossed out and "free meals" substituted.

COPIY-DESK MYSTERY: Last week American newspapers featured reports that the Red Army had dropped leaflets over Finland threatening to destroy Helsinki on Christmas Day. Most papers ignored a subsequent private note from the Associated Press which read: "The Finnish censor has requested that the material in the second lead Finnish about the dropping of pamphlets threatening destruction in Finland if Finland does not surrender be eliminated. We suggest that you eliminate this in order that the work of the Associated Press correspondents in Finland not be handicapped.—The A. P."

"DO NOT PATRONIZE the electrical pinball machine on these premises," reads a sign carried by a C. I. O. picket outside a sandwich shop in Manhattan. The device is serviced by A. F. of L. unionists.

A GENEVA CORRESPONDENT of the *London Times* recently reported "a remarkable display of spontaneous pro-Allied feeling." While he was sitting in a Geneva cafe, he wrote, the rumor spread that Germany had bombarded Holland. "Almost immediately the band began to play the British national anthem and . . . in a few seconds all present were on their feet in solemn silence." The correspondent—and the *Times*—forgot that the Swiss national anthem has the same tune as the British.

A WELL-KNOWN PUBLISHER recently received a letter from an English author which concluded: "The war isn't lost—it's just been mislaid." . . . Non-Sequitur Department: "Those who have followed the testimony elicited by the Temporary National Economic Committee can hardly escape the conclusion that the NLRB in practical operation is a menace." —*Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. . . Over its story of the scuttling of the *Graf Spee* the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* ran the headline: "Captain Blows Up and Sinks *Graf Spee*."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item. —EDITORS THE NATION.]

Issues and Men

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

The War in the Air

Paris, December 2

WHAT of the war in the air? Will that decide the fate of nations? Is it true that the old shibboleth of soldiers, that the infantry in the end always decides, has been done away with? I have just been talking with a diplomat who tells me that the French and English have so completely demonstrated their superiority in the air that in the spring they will completely "do in" the Germans. He was kind enough to give the lion's share of the credit to us Americans, saying that our Curtiss plane was so far ahead of the German Messerschmidt that the French pilots could "get on the tail" of the Germans and shoot them down at leisure.

He then proceeded to give me a rosy picture of what is to come by telling me that after the German airplanes are finished the German cities will receive precisely the same dose of death from the sky that the Germans gave to the Poles; so that once and for all the Germans will learn what war means instead of sitting safe while their soldiers ravage other lands. When I mildly suggested that the Germans claimed they would have 30,000 airplanes in the spring and that it would be miraculous if the Allies could polish them off so easily, he scoffed at those figures and declared that the French and British general staffs knew exactly the type and number of German airplanes and that he was certain they could not possibly put more than 7,500 in the field, many of which would be antiquated.

He did not stop there with his good news, this informant of mine, but went on to say that after the Germans are disposed of, the Allies will be so superior in the air to the rest of the European military powers that they will proceed to straighten out Europe merely by the threat of using their planes. Thus they will send word to Stalin that they will thank him to get out of Poland, give up his concessions from the Baltic states, move out of Finland, and recall his fake people's government from that country. No need of any plan for collective security! The French and English air forces will make the peace of Europe and keep it. I wanted to ask him if Mussolini would also be asked to give up Ethiopia, and Franco to leave Spain for a permanent home in Rome, but just then the lunch hour came and I was bowed out.

Now this was a serious talk with a responsible official in a position to know a lot, and I have set it down without exaggeration exactly as it took place. I cite it because it

clearly illustrates the way the air forces have come to be regarded, especially in France, as all-important. I did not tell my friend that the highest figure given me in Germany by one who has been close to Hitler was actually 60,000 planes and not 30,000. That seemed so preposterous that I was afraid to quote it or to telegraph it to the United States, and so I cut it in half. But I have not forgotten what a former German aviator told some of us last spring out of his familiarity with the German aviation industry, in which he was long employed. He was anti-Hitler, but he declared that after war came the German aircraft industry would be turning out between 10,000 and 12,000 planes a month; five or six German airplane companies, he said, were then employing more than 50,000 men each. I could also have told my confident Paris friend that when I was in Berlin in October the German military men were just as confident that the German aviators had put it all over the Allied fliers and had already won the mastery of the air. I was told there that in May German airplanes would attack England with a ferocity and in numbers undreamed of, and that it would be all over in two months and a half with every English coast city in ruins. In reply I told the Germans that the English were absolutely certain no large enemy force could possibly sweep over England and believed their aviators were showing complete superiority to the Germans. I could have added that the British plane industry has been increased seven fold in a year—an expansion that is regarded as little less than miraculous.

The truth is, I fear, that we shall not know where the superiority lies until air fighting begins on a large scale. Perhaps that will be next month, perhaps later. Much will depend upon the speed with which the German first-line pilots are shot down, for there is a well-founded belief that the second- and third-string men are by no means equal to the first. Neutral military observers are not frightened by the threat of 30,000 airplanes, or of 60,000. They point out that since the Germans allow fifteen men on the ground to every flier, that program calls for 450,000 mechanics and laborers. (This is not, however, an impossible force for Göring to put together.) They also doubt whether it will be possible for the Germans to send more than 300 planes in each "wave" launched against England, and they are not impressed by the German skill in formation flying. But they agree that if the war goes on, next spring will see amazing developments which will perhaps completely alter the gentle art of war as it is now practiced.

BOOKS and the ARTS

The Lesson of the Master

INGRES. By Walter Pach. Harper and Brothers. \$6.

THE topography of modern painting is dominated by two mountains. At the far end rises the Parnassus of Ingres, the throne of Homer, its summit crested by the Parthenon and thronged by the genius of nations in rich and complex symmetry. At the nearer end soars the Mont St. Victoire of Cézanne, its massive angle dominating and defining a landscape wholly divested of human and symbolic associations, its ruggedly sculptured bulk hewn to its final contours. Between these peaks the valleys and lesser promontories fall and rise, their height or flatness determined by the two pinnacles that set the scale. Almost every painter of the past hundred years has worked in the consciousness of their looming presence. By one the tradition of antiquity and Renaissance is fixed and surveyed. By the other the scope of modern invention and the perspectives of future exploration are calculated. Their remoteness and almost polar antithesis are, however, deceptive. They rise from the same foundations and clasp their century in boundaries equal in strength and purpose. Their summits salute one another.

The nearer has naturally been best explored. The critical literature on Cézanne is substantial in all languages. In English it has set a standard of intelligence and corrective restraint caught from the severe integrity of its subject. Ingres has been correspondingly neglected. Except for early appreciations by men as foresighted as Amaury-Duval and Silvestre or the devout researches of Lapauze, Delaborde, and Boyer d'Agen, he has had few serious interpreters. He has never found, as Delacroix found in Baudelaire, a great one. He has had to wait, in fact, until 1939 for a book in English. One had hoped that Roger Fry would enlarge his searching remarks into a volume, but this never came about. Now Mr. Pach provides a survey that should make further ignorance of Ingres's career or his meaning to modern art as inexcusable as the hostility maintained until comparatively recent years by various modern partisans. That hostility has curiously survived—for reasons abandoned even officially a century ago in France—a mastery of resources, a regeneration of methods within a framework of the most forbidding tradition, and an irresistible charm of style and content that remain a unique achievement in two hundred years of painting. Today Ingres rises anew as the genius who not only clarified the formal inheritance of antiquity but extracted from the confusing wealth of the Renaissance its central elements of design, its thematic motives, and its principles of line and mass. He was, moreover, the last great defender of the social and public offices of art against the bourgeois and mechanistic aggressions that were driving it once more to the refuges of subjectivism, bohemianism, and rebellion. He was not alone the pure, the exhaustive, the dedicated, or the prodigal genius we identify in Delacroix, Degas, Cézanne, and Picasso. He was the magistrate, arbiter, and public hero of craft and aesthetic morality, probably the last redeemer of those offices from the trivialities

of academic and popular authority. The grandest of his canvases are themselves an academy and a senate. The least of his drawings combine a matchless and delicate perception with the most rigorous intransigence of law—and they do it by as little as the stroke of a pencil.

These are great claims, but no one who has stayed with Ingres for any term of years finds them vulnerable to critical comparison or the hostility his own pride of rank stimulated among the schools of his day. They offer every possible test to our appreciative and historical faculties. Mr. Pach has made the most of them. His book shows both the advantages and the risks of its pioneer position among English readers. It gives a full account of Ingres's career. It makes use of an enviable opportunity to present in first English translation all of Ingres's important ideas on art from letters, notebooks, and mandates delivered to his pupils, allies, official consultants, and enemies. It concludes with a critical appraisal in which Ingres is measured in his four characters—as revolutionist, classicist, realist, and European, categories by which Mr. Pach aims to define not only his style and method but his place in European civilization and his influence on modern art. Of these three sections the second is admirably edited and indispensable; the first, hearty, enthusiastic, and charming; the third, by turns excited and aggressive, too heavily propagandist in tone, too undefined in its lines of attack and defense, healthily alive to the aesthetic causes and battles of Ingres's lifetime, unhealthily vague in terminology and argument, and, finally, for all the infectious enthusiasm by which it refers those issues to the present—thus giving the book its educational motive—too evasive in fixing the line of Ingres's descent and heritage among his followers. This line and influence are continuously invoked as a means of isolating Ingres's distinction, but they too much remain matters of speeding names and loose analogy, lost in the onrush of Mr. Pach's defensive tactics. He wishes, like every art writer who hopes to have some value outside academic or political quarters, to be an educator; he has axes to grind and causes to urge; he has written "Ananias" and "Queer Thing, Painting" as well as his distinguished translation of Delacroix's "Journals." The heat and journalistic aim of these purposes, so useful in ventilating studios and museums, show their defects when set against a mind and style like Ingres's, for whose serious appreciation are wanted not only the lucidity and cutting eyesight of Fry but something better than a propagandist's bluff approximations of the bearing of Ingres and classic tradition on the painters who, from Géricault to Cézanne and Picasso, stepped forward from the classic moment of 1824.

Lacking this precision, Mr. Pach's book hardly evokes, as it should, the effect and meaning of Ingres's work—the complex and often repellent grandeur of his allegorical tableaux and subject pieces (in which Fry rightly discerned his greatest synthetic and formal powers to lie), the miraculous delicacy and penetration which make his drawings among the most beautiful things ever put on paper, the infinitely subtle har-

monization of abstract design with sensuous authority in the nudes and studies, and that superb sense of milieu by which Ingres, modernizing the Renaissance example, imposed his faces and figures on arbitrary landscape or among the heavily Balzacian interiors of empire and republic, all controlled by his exquisitely selective sense of detail—of garments, scarves, fichus, combs, consoles, ornaments, textures, fringed and studded fauteuils. Such devices define his range, his enrichment of studio and salon by evoking state and society, his mastery of a vast freight of pictorial properties by the most passionate research into line, form, and design. Of that whole achievement—apparently remote from present-day experimental or social considerations and yet so supreme a lesson to them—Ingres's teachings and maxims are a constant illumination, and Mr. Pach has laid open an invaluable apparatus. To anyone who goes from his book to the canvases, the documents, and the research stores of Paris and Montauban, he supplies a guide. If he has not pursued his motives into the necessary exact account of Ingres's devices, discoveries, and lineage, he makes that pursuit inescapable to anyone who takes from his book the twin examples of Ingres's consummate workmanship and the moral rigor of his aesthetic.

Neither of these, however, should subordinate the fact that Ingres is a painter to enjoy in the richest possible sense. The present plates and the increasing number of his works that have come to America—now that collectors' prejudice against his austerity has relaxed after a long-standing preference for the swirling agitations and breathing colors of Delacroix, the romantics, and the modernists—offer the aesthetic intelligence one of its greatest stimulants and rewards. The beauty of his example becomes more emphatic and irresistible as the dissolving tendencies of experiment overstep the bounds of responsibility. His touch on the hand and intellect of his greatest heirs is felt anew. The focus he provides in the history of painting is clarified. The miraculous line, the ultimate harmony, emerges from the sumptuous elegance and freighted tradition of his canvases. A remark by George Moore returns to mind: "Only Ingres and antiquity knew how to simplify."

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

Romains at War

VERDUN. By Jules Romains. (Volume VIII of "Men of Good Will.") Translated from the French by Gerard Hopkins. Alfred A. Knopf. \$2.50.

IT HAS seemed for some time that Jules Romains was running a race with history. While Europe moved toward a second 1914, the author of "Men of Good Will" pushed his long novel toward its climax in the first 1914. And Romains won. In "Death of a World," which appeared here last year, that climax had already been reached. Defunct now were nearly all those benevolent "conspiracies," ranging from socialism to freemasonry, through which Romains's characters had expressed their longing for unity and peace. And the men of good-will were mostly sunk in the spiritual apathy which is supposed to precede a conversion to new intellectual values.

"Verdun," the present volume, revolves around the famous battle and shows us France in the second winter of the

war. The book deals in very great detail with matters of military strategy and action in the field, shuttling continually from G. H. Q., with its discreet rivalries and portentous discussions of policy, to the stinking trench of the common soldier. These, together with the glimpses of war-time Paris, represent the external side of war, and Romains handles them with his usual virtuosity. But he is more effective in exploring the soldier's sensibility: his fears, his disgusts, his angers, the cunning "dreams of safety" devised in his anxious brain, his impulse to look for scapegoats among the female flag-wavers, the slackers and literary phrase-makers in the "back areas."

The soldier is usually an ex-worker or, like the intellectual Jerphanion, an ex-Socialist; and what he does in the trenches is to transfer to the civilians—an amorphous and historically meaningless group—the hostility he formerly felt for the class of employers. On this point Romains is quite explicit, committed though he is to a philosophy that regards all conflict as ultimately illusory; he exhibits war as a kind of gigantic pressure machine that weakens and deforms the traditional social antagonisms. And Jerphanion wonders if demagogues won't "deduce from what's happening certain philosophic and cynically Machiavellian truths for use in the post-war period."

Jerphanion is in fact the main observer and commentator in "Verdun." This joyous empiric and eager amateur of experience is now somewhat embittered. Yet, for all that, his "tone" remains amiable and expansive—so much so, indeed, that he seems a bit shadowy planted in the trenches and proclaiming his disillusionment. And, with qualifications, the same may be said of Romains himself as a war novelist. Brilliant as a sort of running exposition and commentary of war, "Verdun" is rather deficient in dramatic power; in this respect it is certainly not among the best volumes of "Men of Good Will." Romains has a great capacity for enjoyment, an immense gusto for exploring the processes of modern life. Quite at home among the concrete, daylight presences of the upper world, he is best at retailing superior anecdotes of intrigue and unraveling the ingenuities of sophisticated behavior. And such volumes as "Recours à l'abîme" and "Mission à Rome" render the whole series far more important than most Americans seem to realize. Lacking any sort of profound moral passion or tragic feeling Romains can descend into the underworld of war and describe its appearance and its inhabitants, but he cannot quite convince us of its reality.

F. W. DUPREE

Introduction to Dewey

JOHN DEWEY. AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT. By Sidney Hook. The John Day Company. \$2.

IT IS necessary at least to allude to the wide range of Dewey's interests and to the difficulty of his thought to suggest the reason why there has long been a need for an introductory exposition of his philosophy. Sidney Hook meets this need in a book which in almost every respect is an ideal introduction. It is sympathetic and lucid; and the result, as he intended, is a very lively picture of "the sweep and vitality of Dewey's vision."

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Dewey's conception of philosophy, as Hook suggests, occupies a mid-way position between that of the grand tradition and that of the positivists. According to the former, the philosopher gazes from an a priori knoll on the structure of eternity, while the latter demotes him to something like a janitorship in Science Hall. For Dewey, as Hook points out, human values and beliefs constitute the chief subject matter of philosophy; its task is criticism; and its aim is essentially practical, for it seeks finally to meliorate the adventure of living. But both task and aim may be interpreted superficially or philosophically; and the difference between philosopher and reformer or preacher is abysmal. The latter is in a hurry to get things done, and lacks insight into the relevance of abstruse, technical considerations, with which he is impatient. The result is that he changes the sketch but uses the old tools, the old methods of construction, and materials salvaged from the old building, while the philosopher grasps in full the reason for the need to condemn the structure. This leads him into abstruse problems of epistemology, of logic, and of axiology. One of the merits of Hook's exposition is that he keeps us always clearly informed about the relevance of the technical subjects he discusses to the conflicts and anxieties of the social scene. Thus the early chapters of the book—on Truth, Ideas, Logic, and Mind—deal with matters usually thought none too relevant to life as lived by unphilosophic man. And yet in Hook's treatment they are quick with the dramatic emotions of the practical issues to which they are pertinent. And thus, also, Dewey's reliance on intelligence is revealed not as the naive optimism of a professor but as a realistic faith which grows out of a scientific conception of man as a creature of and in nature, endowed with natural capacities which may be used to enhance living.

Hook will no doubt be criticized for reading Dewey from a positivist standpoint. Not that Hook reads positivism into Dewey, but rather that he emphasizes it to a degree which will seem an exaggeration to those who read Dewey with an interest in speculative philosophy. Traditionalists will point out that Dewey would have included among the philosopher's tasks the metaphysical, along with those which Hook mentions in the second chapter: criticism of belief, of values, and investigation of methods of inquiry. They will observe that in another chapter Hook attributes to Dewey a virtual denial of the validity of the metaphysical task, when one of his most important books, "Experience and Nature," is thought of by Dewey as a venture in metaphysics. And they will urge that Dewey's conception of method and his attack on all forms of philosophical as well as practical absolutism cannot be dismembered from his view of the universe as constituted by events, a view of which Hook gives no adequate account. In short, they will argue that Hook gives an account of Dewey with the recent "Logic" uppermost in his mind, as might have been expected from a man who has been flirting with the positivists. But for the objection to retain a semblance of fairness it must be raised solely as an issue of degree or emphasis, not of exclusive alternatives. And Hook could answer that accent on a philosopher's method is all to the good, since his doctrines are remembered because they give us, not a fake substitute for physics and astronomy under the rubric of ontology, but a method which enables us to reject or improve on his insights and thus to push on.

A fuller treatment of Dewey's intellectual origins will be missed—of his debt to Peirce, to James, and to the idealists, as well as an account of his relations to his contemporaries, to Mead, Santayana, Russell, Whitehead, and the others. Such a study would have helped to place Dewey much more fully in the matrix of his day and culture than Hook does. But this is a minor objection, and it is partly obviated by the way in which the exposition of doctrine is carried on at every step by means of contrast with current opposing views. It should not therefore be taken as a serious stricture on a brilliantly executed performance for which there was a very genuine need.

ELISEO VIVAS

The Great Dilemma

BARBARIANS WITHIN AND WITHOUT. By Leonard Woolf. Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$1.50.

UNDER the three headings of The World We Live In, Anatomy of Civilization, and The Choice Before Us, Leonard Woolf gives us in very brief compass the historical and immediate reasons for his belief that freedom is not only superior to tyranny but also stronger and harder to achieve. His easy and lucid manner of exposition happily blends illustration with inference, so that we are led in the course of 180 pages from his initial point that the nineteenth century had a civilized conscience to his conclusion that since "Western civilization" means the "full development of a society of free men," what we are now witnessing is a series of conflicts, national and international, between civilized man and barbarian.

The poignancy of the drama, according to Mr. Woolf, comes from the fact that Russia, with its understanding of what economic civilization should mean, forgets what intellectual and political civilization requires; while the democracies, with their continued faith in political and civil liberties, fail to see that their institutions have to be modernized in order to insure a genuinely free society. That is why the barbarian is both within and without.

With this underlying thesis it would be difficult to quarrel, as it is with Mr. Woolf's insistence that the way to get at working principles in the contemporary chaos is "through a process of historical analysis." It is his use of the analytic process itself, his way of condensing and using history, that raises recurring doubts in the reader and a sense of perpetual self-contradiction. Making allowance for the difficulty of putting complex slices of European history into simple sentences, it still remains necessary to mention a few of the insecure props on which the author rests his case. The superior conscience of the nineteenth century and its rapid decline into modern cynicism are, I believe, an illusion of perspective. The few "outrages" of the last century that Mr. Woolf discusses by no means exhaust the tale of that century's depravity, and the indignation that followed these few selected instances could be matched by corresponding feeling in our own times. New ways of imparting and playing up news would go far to explain the surface difference.

Again, Mr. Woolf's passion for the Greeks tends to soften in his eyes the crudities of their political life. The Greeks loved freedom—as we do—largely because they were without

it. The *tyrannis* and the demagogues are facts of Greek history, and it is not enough to cite Pericles's Fourth of July Address as if the ideal were the fact. Mr. Woolf himself occasionally recognizes it, and it is at such times that he contradicts himself.

As a final sample of his confusions, one can point to his contention that in modern Europe the barbarian system is an easy one to establish and keep going, whereas a free society is very difficult even to plan in theory. The mistake here is to believe that the ready appeal of barbarian methods—force, hatred, and obscurantism—makes the system which is based on them particularly stable and smooth-running. The reverse is true, since emotional tensions and ever-increasing displays of force tax the strength and ingenuity of both leaders and led, at the same time as the desire for freedom and the inquiring spirit regain an entrance into the minds of men. Fortunately for the reader who might be made skeptical by such details as these, Mr. Woolf ends his readable little sermon on the note of Trust Freedom and It Shall Not Fail You.

JACQUES BARZUN

General Krivitsky

IN STALIN'S SECRET SERVICE. By W. G. Krivitsky. Harper and Brothers. \$3.

NO MATTER where you stand on the question of Soviet politics, you are going to read W. G. Krivitsky's "In Stalin's Secret Service." Its value is not decreased by the fact that a large part of the book was published in the *Saturday Evening Post* during the last twelve months, for Mr. Krivitsky has added so many interesting details to the original version that it is well worth rereading.

It is not customary to devote too much space to the private life of the author in a critical analysis of his work. In this case, however, the reader's attitude toward the book will depend so largely on his willingness to accept the author's version of what has been happening behind the scenes in the Soviet Union that a knowledge of his past and the role he played in Soviet activities is imperative. The value of the book rests almost entirely on the reader's estimate of Mr. Krivitsky's personal integrity.

That being the case, it was to be expected that the Communist press should choose, as the easiest way to discredit this gruesome revelation of twenty years of Soviet diplomacy, to attack Krivitsky's credibility. They called him an impostor, a liar and adventurer, an Austrian gambler, a Viennese cafe habitué. Since Mr. Krivitsky's work demanded secrecy and anonymity, he was known to few outside the Soviet secret service, and disavowing him seemed the best defense. Significantly not one of his Soviet detractors seems to have been able to uncover a single discreditable action in his "infamous" past.

On the other hand, Mr. Krivitsky is vouched for by two men of unassailable position in world politics—Léon Blum, leader of the French Socialist Party and former Premier of France, and William C. Bullitt, American ambassador in Paris—who have known Mr. Krivitsky for years and were instrumental in securing his admission to the United States. Both men are so well established in the opinion of the world

for the almost religious rigidity of their ethical and moral standards that any man who has their indorsement deserves at least a respectful hearing.

Nevertheless, there has been, even among impartial reviewers of his book, a feeling of distrust and uncertainty. They find it incongruous that a man who could work for almost two decades in the Soviet secret service, with all that this means in terms of murder, crime, and cruelty, should turn against the whole system when it demanded the framing and perhaps assassination of one of his friends. To understand this, one must know Krivitsky's past and have some conception besides of the lengths to which a religious faith in a revolutionary movement can persuade its adherents to go.

The author was at the impressionable age of eighteen when the Russian Revolution started Russia on a new epoch in November, 1917. "The Bolshevik Revolution," I quote Krivitsky's own words, "came to me as an absolute solution of all problems of poverty, inequality, and injustice. I joined the Bolshevik Party with my whole soul. I seized the Marxist and Leninist faith as a weapon with which to assault the wrongs against which I instinctively rebelled." How many of us, even outside Russia, went through the same experience! Suddenly we found ourselves walking in the sun, in a world that had taken on a new meaning. There were hesitations, qualms, even doubts, but we dismissed them. "When a nation's life's at hazard, we've no time to think of men!" Crimes ceased to be crimes when they helped a new world into being. Perhaps one must have lived through all this—the fervor, the high expectations, the qualms, the doubts, and the final disillusionment when doubt was no longer possible—to understand a man like General Krivitsky.

Knowing Mr. Krivitsky's past I am convinced that there are many episodes in his experience that he has not told. He worked in the G. P. U. during Stalin's regime, but he cannot help knowing that the methods Stalin used did not differ greatly from those employed by the Soviet secret service under Lenin and Trotsky. The character of the victims changed, but the methods were the same. The methods of terror never vary. The secret institutions of every dictatorship are always brutal, arbitrary, dishonest, and merciless. Mayor Gaynor once spoke of the necessity of "outward decency." Dictatorships, proletarian or otherwise, have no need for this thin veneer of outward decency which saves democratic government from disintegration.

It is difficult to say which of the eight chapters is most interesting. *Stalin Appeals Hitler and The End of the Communist International* lay bare the workings of the ruthless political machine that has plunged the world into war. Why Did They Confess?—the tragic story of the Moscow trials—gives what seems to me the first convincing explanation of that mystery, even though it leaves much to be explained.

"In Stalin's Secret Service" will not be judged by the usual standards. A book that deals with so controversial a subject will produce reactions too violent to permit dispassionate judgment. But there are many thousands still who are capable of approaching even this book with an open mind, men and women who are making an honest effort to understand the situation in present-day Russia and the motives that led to its astounding betrayal of a nobler past.

LUDWIG LORE

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January 6, 1940

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FILMS

THE former German producer, Max Glass, is responsible for the French picture, "Entente Cordiale," which is running simultaneously in two New York theaters, but which I assume does not aspire to compete with "Gone with the Wind." It celebrates with enthusiasm and with an eye to propaganda, no doubt, the beginning of the English-French alliance—the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale of 1904. Nevertheless, it cannot be shown in England because its main character, Edward VII, died only twenty-nine years ago and England does not yet allow his portrayal. Otherwise the picture should give no offense even in Britain. The war censorship could easily eliminate the crack at the present Prime Minister, of whom the elder Chamberlain says, "A good business man, perhaps, or a lawyer; but he will never make a politician." The German people get a few good words, while their leader is duly characterized—in the picture he is the irresponsible Wilhelm II but the remarks about him fit Adolf Hitler like a glove. They are made by Edward in an irresistibly charming way, like all the other remarks in this picture. Only a moviegoer who expects to see a realistic treatment of one of the most decisive developments in our young and historically overcrowded century could be offended or disappointed by it. The more cynical escapist who takes his entertainment where and under whatever pretexts he can will enjoy this newest importation from Paris.

Based on André Maurois's "Edward VII and His Time," the film has no plot in the conventional sense of the word. It has, rather, a theme—Edward's diplomatic maneuvering toward a lasting English-French friendship. The love interest is happily reduced to unessential by-play. Starting with Queen Victoria's worries about Egypt and the Fashoda incident, we follow the gradual development of the entente through its diplomatic stages. We see Lord Salisbury, Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain, Delcassé, Clemenceau, Cambon, von Bülow, and Isvolsky, if not exactly at work, at least involved in intrigue. Only Edward seems to be really at work. He knows from the beginning exactly what he wants and how to achieve it by almost playful methods. In comparison with him Delcassé looks like a tailor and the Tiger Clemenceau like a little shoemaker, not to speak of the timid French President. I suspect that they really looked like that, but Edward has been idealized; and in addition all the situations and lines are given to him. This makes for an effective movie character unburdened by the complexity of reality.

Victor Francen, seen last in "That They May Live" as the ex-soldier who becomes insane in his unsuccessful fight for peace, gives a brilliant performance as Edward VII. He creates such a witty, human, and superior personality that one enjoys him, however great the discrepancy between his characterization and the original may be. At the opera in Paris, where he conquers his icy hosts, and in the interview with the German ambassador he is a sheer delight. But if he leaves the rest of an excellent cast far behind, it is also because they have only bits while he never leaves the screen. Special credit is to be given to the young actress Janine

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Common Sense

W. H. AUDEN discusses the same problem from a different angle in *Poet and Politician*, an essay in the same issue.

MAX EASTMAN begins a notable discussion of the underlying failure of Marxism (Stalinist and Trotskyist varieties) in *Socialism Revalued*.

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Darcey, who plays a short love scene exquisitely. Marcel L'Herbier directed the lavishly produced picture with his focus on little ironical details; it was the best he could do with a superficial script incapable of bearing dramatic weight.

Those who like Charlie McCarthy should not see his picture "Charlie McCarthy, Detective." It is one of the stupidest films ever produced. Charlie from time to time goes through his radio routine, while the cheap gangster plot unravels itself around him. To see him so thoroughly misused is irritating. The illusion his voice creates over the radio is destroyed by the demonstration of its mechanics and by the bad acting of Mr. Bergen.

"Remember" (MGM) is a feeble play with a pretty good third act. Lovely Greer Garson, the former Mrs. Chips, and Lew Ayers play Robert Taylor off the screen in every scene, but for box-office reasons he still gets the girl.

"The Honeymoon's Over" (Twentieth Century-Fox) is a moralistic Class B picture you needn't see at all, though Stuart Erwin is an amiable and gifted actor. He really deserves a good picture.

FRANZ HOELLERING

RECORDS

COLUMBIA has issued a new set of Mozart's "Linz" Symphony K.425 made by Beecham with the London Philharmonic (M-387, \$5.50). If you already have the Busch set of three or four years ago you have a clear recording of an excellent performance. But if you have no set the new one gives the work greater power and impact—achieved partly through Beecham's characteristically dynamic phrasing, partly through his characteristically slower tempos, and partly through the present-day richness and spaciousness in the recording. I find the pace of the first movement Allegro spiritoso and again of the Minuet a little over-deliberate; and the pause before the concluding measure of the Minuet is the sort of lily-gilding Beecham should leave to Walter Damrosch.

Victor has issued two H. M. V. subscription sets. One (M-595, \$14) offers four more string quartets of Haydn: Opus 1 No. 1, Opus 20 No. 1, Opus 55 No. 3, Opus 76 No. 4. In these one hears the inexhaustible fecundity and variety of invention, and such things as the sustained loveliness of the slow movement of Opus 20 No. 1, the darting humor of its finale and of the Minuet of Opus 55 No. 3, the breadth and splendor of the first movement of Opus 76 No. 4. The Pro Arte performances are good, but without the brilliance, the fire which these works should have, and which one can imagine the Budapest or Primrose Quartet giving them.

The other (M-611, \$12) offers Bach's Suites Nos. 2 and 3 for solo 'cello, played by Pablo Casals. Listening to these works, one is aware of Bach's success with the difficult problem he set himself—"to make his melody flow freely . . . to see that its direction suggests the harmony which is not heard"—but also of the fact that solving this problem was not equivalent to writing great or interesting music. The life the works have on these records is the life created by the

coloring, the movement, the tensions of Casals's phrasing; and I am thinking not only of the bold, powerful distention of the phrases of the vigorous movements, but of the subtle inflection of the Sarabande of No. 2. This is something you would almost not believe you had heard in a performance, after it was over; but you can put the needle back at the beginning and find that it did happen; and there it is on the record for all time, as other such achievements are on canvas or in print.

Completely uninteresting to me are several other major Columbia releases: the fluency of Arnold Bax's Viola Sonata, Nonett and "Mater Ora Filium," excellently recorded by Primrose, the Griller quartet, the B. B. C. Chorus and others (M-386, \$14); the arid, grimacing Kleine Kammermusik of Hindemith, Opus 24 No. 2, well done by the Los Angeles Wind Quintet (X-149, \$2.50); the arid String Quartet No. 1 of Walter Piston, also well done by the Dorian Quartet (M-388, \$5). More rewarding are two single records—one (69752-D, \$1.50) with a work of Buxtehude sung under the title of "Send hid den Engel" by the Copenhagen Men and Boys' Choir with strings and organ; the other (69751-D, \$1.50) with the "Elegy" of the English composer Herbert Howells, played by the Jacques String Orchestra. Not great works, but enjoyable. After the enchanting style in which Franz Rupp played a Chopin waltz at his recent recital, Kilenyi's zigzagging in the complete Columbia set of the waltzes (M-390, \$7.50) sounds like something contrived without real feeling for the genre and without first-rate musical taste. As for the volume of recently discovered music by Johann Strauss (M-389, \$5), it is enjoyable even in the straightforward performances without much feeling for the genre recorded by Howard Barlow with the Columbia Broadcasting Company.

Columbia's surfaces, I regret to report, continue to be troublesome.

Among recent jazz records are two made by small groups of excellent musicians who play together with superb vitality and ensemble feeling: the Muggsy Spanier "Dipper Mouth Blues" and "Sister Kate" (Bluebird 10506) and Jelly Roll Morton "West End Blues" (Bluebird 10442). Quite good also, with a little more sophistication, a little less vitality, are the Bud Freeman "Satanic Blues" (Decca 2781) and "As Long as I Live" (Decca 2849). The Benny Goodman Sextet is in effect a small band, of which Goodman himself—in "Rose Room" (Columbia 35254)—plays as though he were bored, Hampton continues to mess things up with the sound of his vibraphone, and Charlie Christian on guitar and Arthur Bernstein on bass are the only ones who play with distinction. Coleman Hawkins contributes two fine opening phrases to the otherwise uninteresting Lionel Hampton "One Sweet Letter from You" (Victor 26393), and exhibits the extraordinary rhythmic intricacy of his style, if not his highest musical imagination, in his "She's Funny That Way" (Bluebird 10477). Count Basie's distinctive piano style can be heard at length with a background by his extraordinary rhythm section in "Fare Thee Honey Fare Thee Well" and "Oh! Red" (Decca 2780). The Kirby Orchestra's "Royal Garden Blues" (Vocalion 5187) is over-arranged—and "Blue Skies" on the reverse side atrociously so—but the playing continues to be exciting.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

Catholic Journalism

Dear Sirs: In your issue of December 16 you give display to an article making strong assertions concerning the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service. As the director of that service may I comment briefly?

The article first recites a number of often-told facts about the Catholic press—its size, its variety, its obvious independence of thought ("a Catholic of any political point of view can today find at least one Catholic paper to suit his taste"), its sponsorship, and how it is serviced. It then makes a number of extravagant charges without giving substantiating evidence. With respect to the N. C. W. C. News Service, it makes a sweeping assertion of "dishonesty," but omits any attempt at proof. It lists nine points in the "stand" of the Catholic press on the Spanish war, summarily calls them "demonstrably false," then neglects to demonstrate the "falsity" of a single one.

One can scarcely disprove evidence that is not given. This piece was written by one Mr. Southworth. Surely it must be agreed that the name in itself is without authority. Thus the honestly questioning reader must look to positive statements in the writing itself to discover just how much credence may be placed in the author's mere *ipse dixit* statements. It is here I hope I may be able to assist readers of *The Nation*.

The *Catholic Worker* is described as a publication of "small circulation." Actually, its circulation is between 105,000 and 125,000 monthly.

The Catholic Press Association is given as "founded in 1890," whereas actually it was organized in 1911.

The publication *Social Justice* is first called a "Catholic journal," then is shown to be not included in a listing of Catholic publications; it is said to have lost "approval" early this year, and immediately afterward is quoted as an authority on the Catholic press. Actually, the attorney for *Social Justice* has certified that it "is not and never has been a Catholic publication," and certainly the present Archbishop of Detroit has neither given nor withdrawn approval since he went to Detroit in August, 1937. *Social Justice* is thus by no means "the most widely circulated Catholic journal of our times," as asserted.

Catholic papers belonging to com-

panies "controlled by wealthy laymen" are such a rarity that Mr. Southworth did not undertake to name even one.

The N. C. W. C. News Service does not "service twenty-four foreign countries," although it does have as subscribers some Catholic publications in that many lands.

The N. C. W. C. News Service did report Father Coughlin, but so did every other news service in the country.

As for the N. C. W. C. News Service's coverage of the civil war in Spain, since the close of that conflict persons of high authority and integrity—chiefly non-Catholics—have come forward to vindicate the factual statements made by the service. Among others, Señor Araquistáin, former Spanish Republican ambassador to France; William Philip Simms, distinguished foreign editor of Scripps-Howard; and Hugh Gibson, noted as diplomat and writer, are not by any means trivial or *ex parte* witnesses.

It was only recently that Mr. Gibson made a radio address after a 5,000-mile motor trip through Spain, in the course of which he interviewed hundreds of persons in every walk of life, including former Loyalist politicians and soldiers. He testifies in positive terms to the truth of many of the facts reported by this news service. Of particular significance is this statement by Mr. Gibson: "Much of what I have to tell you is so radically different from what you have been fed for the past few years that I shall confine myself as far as possible to statements of fact which can be verified by anybody who really wants to know the truth and who does not accept propaganda as fact."

It is, of course, obvious from the article itself that it is merely an anti-Catholic attack. Judging the writer's unsupported statements by an examination of such of his assertions as can be checked, I suggest that we have here only evidence of a will to make reckless charges, a rare irresponsibility, and sloppiness of both mind and workmanship.

FRANK A. HALL

Washington, D. C., December 23

Dear Sirs: I have read Mr. Hall's letter with more attention and respect than its unbridled language would seem to deserve, and, frankly, I am more than ever convinced that the record of the Catholic press on Spain and recent interna-

tional politics is utterly indefensible. On one point Mr. Hall has me: I was wrong in referring to the *Catholic Worker's* circulation as small. However, on the founding of the Catholic Press Association, let me cite my authority, Father Thomas F. Meehan, who wrote in *America* (June 24, 1939) that it was founded in 1890 and incorporated in 1911.

Father Coughlin is a priest in good standing; his *Social Justice* carried on its editorial page until January 9, 1939, the permission of his superior to publish. I am not one of those who believe that the powerful Roman Catholic church is unable to curb the radio priest of Royal Oak, for I have noticed how effectively it curbed bishops and even a cardinal in Spain who were out of sympathy with Franco and how it condoned the execution by Franco of Basque priests through the Primate of Spain, who spoke of "the aberration of certain priests which brought them in front of a firing squad." It would be a comparatively simple matter for the church to dissociate itself from the priest Coughlin for his political "aberrations."

Mr. Hall's service handles news of special interest to Catholics and clearly cannot be judged by the same criteria as "every other news service in the country."

For a Catholic paper belonging to a company "controlled by wealthy laymen" I refer Mr. Hall to New York's archdiocesan organ, the *Catholic News*, among others.

I listed nine demonstrable untruths which formed the basis of the Catholic propaganda for Franco in this country. If I failed to develop them, it was for obvious reasons of space, and also because their falsity has been often proved. Would not Mr. Hall do better to offer some defense of the Catholic press record? Does the N. C. W. C. News Service still maintain that the Popular Front government won power by fraud and violence? Its own correspondent, the Reverend Manuel Grana, did not say so in his dispatches written before the war, before the "line" was adopted. The Vatican attested that government's legality when it accepted an ambassador, as did Franco and other generals when they reaffirmed their loyalty in April, 1936.

Mr. Hall's news service sends out

items glorifying José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the fascist Phalanx. Is it possible that he has not read José Antonio's speeches? Is it possible that he does not yet know that the Phalanx, presented to democratic American Catholics as twentieth-century crusaders, was in reality the political party most openly dedicated to terrorism as a political weapon in all Western Europe? Would Mr. Hall defend that cardinal point of Catholic propaganda that the disorders of the spring of 1936 justified Franco's rising? Let him read "Onésimo Redondo" (Valladolid, 1937), in which Phalanx leaders proudly reveal that it was the "crusaders" who provoked the violence. Does Mr. Hall believe that the murder of Calvo Sotelo provoked the rebellion? Let him read in detail the conspiracy as revealed by José María Iribarren in his life of Mola, by Bertrán Güell in "Preparación y desarrollo del alazamiento nacional," and by numerous other pro-Franco writers published under Franco's censorship. Does Mr. Hall still believe that German and Italian intervention followed Soviet Russia's, even after the confessions of Hitler and Mussolini to the contrary?

It is true that William Philip Simms and Hugh Gibson, as well as Martin Dies, Merwin Hart, and H. L. Mencken, have fallen for and retailed many "facts" on Spain of the kind sponsored by the N. C. W. C. I am surprised to find a Catholic holding to the view that error is transmuted into truth if its sponsorship is sufficiently distinguished. Mr. Simms wrote an editorial for the Scripps-Howard newspapers on March 9, 1939, called Army Within an Army, in which the simplest known historical facts were mishandled with a recklessness that is more reprehensible than mere ignorance. Hugh Gibson's remarks on Spain were adequately disposed of by Jay Allen in the *Protestant Digest* of November, 1939, an article as yet unanswered, I believe. Before the N. C. W. C. News Service embraces Luis Araquistáin as its vindicator, I suggest that it read that stout defender of a Marxist revolutionary ideal with greater care. The devil quoting Scripture is on no shakier ground than the N. C. W. C. quoting the founder of *Claridad*.

If it is "anti-Catholic" for me to cite the facts of the war in Spain, facts chiefly drawn from Franco sources, then some very distinguished members of Mr. Hall's church are also "anti-Catholic." In this category would fall the columnist in the *New World*, archdiocesan organ of Chicago (December

22, 1939), who refers to my article in words which I can only interpret as commanding its accuracy.

H. RUTLEDGE SOUTHWORTH
New York, December 28

An Anti-Fascist in Canada

Dear Sirs: The issue of *The Nation* of October 28 contained an article by S. J. Kennedy headed Let Canada Be a Warning, in which the writer discussed the new war measure in Canada known as The Defense of Canada Regulations Decree, Section 39(a). Under this measure, which became law on September 18, four Italian anti-fascists and one Cuban were arrested on October 4, their premises raided, and a truckload of literature taken away by the "Red Squad" and the Mounted Police.

Since then two trials have taken place—one dealing with the charge of "having printed and distributed literature intended or likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty," the other with two broken, rusty revolvers found in the room of Arthur Bortolotti, the most outstanding personality of the Italian group. Both trials brought out clearly the Red Squad's efforts to convict the men. In both all the defendants were entirely exonerated.

But Arthur Bortolotti now finds himself under the jurisdiction of the immigration authorities, though he has lived in Canada for twenty years without being molested. Arthur Bortolotti is an ardent anti-fascist, completely dedicated to the effort to prevent fascism from taking root in Canada. He uncovered a fascist school in Windsor where Canadian children were being taught the blessings of Mussolini and thereby incurred the hatred of the Fascists. When the war decrees went into effect, the black elements saw their chance. It is reasonably certain that they were back of the arrest. Having failed to send Bortolotti to the penitentiary, they are determined to bring about his deportation to Italy.

Mr. Kennedy stressed the fact that "the outcome of the case will be watched anxiously by people who have scarcely heard of anarchism, who have only a nodding—and, at the moment, curtly nodding—acquaintance with communism, but who fear that their own small liberties will be affected." The author was entirely too optimistic. In point of fact, the people of this city seem not to care about their liberties sufficiently to "watch anxiously" the outcome of the arrests. As to the press,

with the exception of a few lines reporting the trials, the papers in this city have maintained a conspiracy of silence. The liberal evening paper, so termed, in this city has refused to acquaint its readers with the full implication of the decrees or the fate awaiting Arthur Bortolotti. A protest in *The Nation* and other publications may instil some courage in a few liberal-minded people in Canada to raise their voices in behalf of Arthur Bortolotti and to give his defense moral and financial support. Contributions may be sent to Miss Clara Fredericks, 45 West Seventeenth Street, New York City.

E. G.

Toronto, Canada, December 23

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